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ABSTRACT 
 
SOWMYA SRIRAM NARAYANAN:  Essays on Operational Productivity and Customer 
Satisfaction in offshore Software Projects (Under the joint supervision of Prof. Jayashankar 
M. Swaminathan and Prof. Sridhar Balasubramanian) 
 
In recent times, both academia and practitioners have increasingly focused on the importance 
of offshore outsourcing. Analysts estimate that the offshore component of IT services is 
expected to rise to $70 billion by 2007. Despite this increase, the popular press has cited 
dissatisfaction among firms that have outsourced software projects to offshore locations. 
Primary reasons cited for the customer dissatisfaction with outsourcing include the increased 
complexity of managing the relationship, reduced productivity and reduced operational 
effectiveness. This issue has not received much academic attention. This dissertation 
attempts to address this gap in the academic literature by studying the problem from two 
different perspectives of a software supply chain.  
 The first perspective is effectiveness – where the focus is on managing the internal 
processes to have a positive impact on customers. This is important, because a satisfied 
customer is key to a successful and profitable organization. Accordingly, in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, we study the determinants of project performance and customer satisfaction in 
outsourced offshore software projects. The second perspective is the internal efficiency – 
where focus is on increasing the efficiency of processes and people; thus, leading to increase 
in productivity. Clearly these two perspectives are intertwined. An understanding of factors 
affecting productivity of individuals will enable the managers to set appropriate goals for 
iv
team members, improve delivery performance, and ultimately increase customer satisfaction. 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation investigate productivity improvement using software 
maintenance as a context. In Chapter 3, we investigate the role of both individual-level 
factors, such as overall experience, task variety, and newness of task handled, and team-level 
factors such as team size, new team member entry, and team member exit, on individual 
productivity. Next, in Chapter 4, we investigate how productivity can be improved by better 
allocation of individual’s effort to tasks that have the following property: the longer it takes 
to resolve the task, the less is the likelihood that the task will be completed successfully. 
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1CHAPTER 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Outsourcing overview and research motivation 
An emerging global workforce, greater availability of information technology, and 
increasing global competition are redefining service delivery value chains by enabling the 
disaggregation of services (Quinn 1992). The ability to disaggregate activities in products 
and services has led to increased outsourcing of products and services (Apte and Mason 
1995).  IT services, including software based services, have been a part of this phenomenon. 
The scale of outsourcing in software services can be judged from the fact that the 
International Data Corporation (IDC) estimated the global demand of software-based IT 
services to be USD 382.1 billion, of which, outsourced IT services were USD 118.2 billion 
(IDC 2003).  Much of the outsourced work is ‘offshored’ and goes to developing nations in 
various parts of the world like India and China. The resulting global supply chain of products 
and services presents challenges to managers in coordinating and executing work 
(Swaminathan and Tayur 2003).  
For supply chain partners, these challenges can lead to problems in delivering 
expected output. In the outsourced software services domain, evidence of such problems are 
starting to appear. For example, a recent practitioner survey reported that the overall 
satisfaction index of outsourcers fell to 6.4 on a scale of 10 in 2004, as compared to 7.1 in 
2003. The study also found that only 62% of the respondents were satisfied with their 
2outsourcing partners in 2004 as compared to 79% a year ago in 2003. In particular, offshored 
projects were cited as difficult to manage because of the complexity in managing the 
relationship, and problems of cultural adjustment between teams working in different 
countries (Mcdougall 2004). Another study found an appalling 51% of the clients wanting to 
terminate their outsourcing contracts due to lack of satisfaction with outsourced software 
projects, citing poor quality, reduced operational effectiveness and greater management 
complexity as the primary reasons (McEachern 2005). These studies also indicate that the 
problems lie with both the service provider and clients alike.  
From a customers’ perspective, dissatisfaction could be due to systemic problems 
with managing offshore processes, having wrong or unreasonable expectations, and lack of 
awareness of how to make offshore outsourcing to succeed. For example, Gartner – a leading 
market research agency – found that one of the top 5 reasons for failure of offshore projects 
was the general tendency of firms to rush offshore, and enter into deals too hastily (Huntley 
2005). The key reasons for failure of offshore projects were unrealized cost savings, loss of 
productivity, poor commitment and communications, cultural differences, lack of expertise 
and organizational readiness. Interestingly, the report also indicates that exploiting potential 
productivity advantages from offshoring needs planning and patience (Huntley 2005).  
From a service provider’s perspective, problems may lie in developing effective 
delivery capabilities such as effective project management, communication, and improving 
productivity of employees. These capabilities may have a significant impact on customer 
satisfaction. Further, developing these capabilities can be challenging given the competitive 
environment which is characterized by high employee turnover, shortage of talent, and 
demanding customers.  
3Despite considerable amount of research in the area of outsourcing1, there is less 
understanding about what drives outsourced offshore projects to succeed, and even less so on 
how offshore firms can operate more efficiently. While numerous articles in the popular 
press have been published to educate practicing managers on issues related to offshore 
software outsourcing, the empirical research on the topic is limited but for a few notable 
exceptions (e.g. Gopal et al. 2003; Ethiraj et al. 2005). Second, there has been little work that 
has examined outsourcing from a service operations lens. Such a perspective can (1) help 
incorporate customers’ evaluations of performance into better management of processes (2) 
lead to a better understanding of the processes in the firm and enable efficient management 
of activities. Integrating these perspectives can help managers and researchers better 
understand and manage software operations. Given that labor is one of the critical 
components of the overall software development cost (e.g. more than 75% of the software 
development costs are expended on labor costs (Amoriebata et al. 2001)), improving labor 
productivity is a critical problem and central to the operations in software environments. 
Further, improving labor productivity, in turn, may improve customer satisfaction. This 
dissertation aims to address these issues in software services environments and contribute to 
a better understanding of these dual perspectives – improving customer satisfaction and 
improving internal productivity – of the software supply chain. The context of this 
dissertation is an offshore services firm from India. The choice of an Indian firm to study 
management of offshored IT services is reasonable given that India, is by far, the largest 
destination for offshored  software services (Carmel and Tija 2005). The next section outlines 
an overview of the Indian software services industry.   
 
1 A comprehensive overview of the current literature on IT outsourcing can be found in Dibbern et al. (2004) 
41.2. Indian software services Industry: Overview 
India has emerged to be one of the important locations in the software offshoring 
industry competing with several other countries such as China, Philippines, Vietnam and 
Russia (MacFarlan 1995). Recently India took the top spot as the choice among US 
businesses that are looking to outsource technology work offshore, in a survey conducted by 
a leading IT outsourcing consulting firm – NEO IT. Much of the initial IT services revenues 
for most large companies in India came from the Y2K times – year 2000 bug – when several 
US firms frantically sought external resources to help in achieving Y2K compliance on time. 
Under such conditions, many of the firms that employed Indian engineers found value in the 
low cost labor that they provided. Further, the quality focus of the Indian firms enabled them 
to expand from regular non-critical activities to executing more critical set of activities from 
offshore. An evidence of this can be seen from the fact that, as of December 2005, over 400 
Indian companies had acquired quality certifications. Out of the 400, 85 companies were 
assessed at SEI-CMM Level 5. This is the highest level of process maturity that a firm can 
achieve. This number is the highest amongst any country in the world.  
Further, in terms of variety of services, the IT services market in India has grown 
from providing custom application development and maintenance services to providing other 
services like packaged software implementation, systems integration, network consulting and 
integration, IT consulting, and IT support and training (NASSCOM 2005). Of all the 
services, the biggest share of IT services came from custom application development and 
maintenance which accounted for 51% of India’s total exports – accounting for the largest 
percentage of India’s exports – in the financial year 2004. These services have a very high 
offshore content of 85% (NASSCOM 2005). In terms of depth, export of global R&D 
5services, and product development services from India is expected to grow rapidly from a 
current USD 2.3 billion to 8-11 billion between 2008 and 2010 (NASSCOM 2005). Not only 
is the complexity of work managed by the Indian companies growing, the depth of the 
relationship in the engagements between the Indian Service providers and their clients has 
also been on the rise. Reflecting this trend in the increasing depth of relationship, the 
National Association of Indian Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), in its 
strategic review of the Indian IT services industry for 2005 states that “Over time off-shoring 
software has grown from one off, project based engagements involved in low end activities to 
longer term engagements often involving multiple, more complex tasks” (NASSCOM 2005, 
p. 23). Lastly, the client base for the Indian IT-ITES firms includes a majority of the top 2000 
Global corporations (NASSCOM 2005). Thus, India constitutes a very important element of 
global offshore environment. 
 
1.3. Dissertation overview 
 To understand the dynamics of software delivery better, this dissertation divides the 
software supply chain into two perspectives. The first is the external perspective – where 
managers need to be concerned with “How the management of practices within the firm 
impacts their customers?” This question is important, because a satisfied customer is the key 
to a successful and profitable organization. The second perspective is the internally focused – 
where managers need to understand the antecedents to improving operational performance. 
This, in turn, may lead to higher customer satisfaction. An understanding of factors affecting 
team productivity will enable the managers to set appropriate goals for team members, 
improve delivery performance, and ultimately, increase customer satisfaction. This 
6dissertation studies these two facets of a software supply chain in a sequence of three essays. 
The first essay investigates the determinants of customer satisfaction, and the other two 
essays investigate the determinants of productivity in software services. 
 
External Perspective 
This part of the dissertation focuses on the role of internal processes in improving 
customer satisfaction and project performance. In this essay – essay 1 – titled “Managing 
Outsourced Offshore Projects: Antecedents of Project Performance and Customer 
Satisfaction”, we adopt a multidisciplinary perspective to investigate the antecedents of 
customer satisfaction and project performance in offshore projects. This work offers 
managerial and theoretical insights on successful management of offshore projects through 
an empirical analysis of real life data.  
In this work, we synthesize extant literature on service operations, marketing, and 
software engineering disciplines to develop a conceptual model of the antecedents of project 
performance and customer satisfaction in outsourced software projects. Using archival 
survey data on customer satisfaction and project performance ratings of projects executed 
offshore by an Indian software services firm, we examine the influence of communication 
effectiveness (defined as how well the offshore team can communicate), team stability 
(defined as the overall longevity of engineers in the team and smoothness of work transition 
in case of turnover), project management capability (defined as the ability to plan work, 
manage priorities and handle project risks) and project performance (defined as adherence to 
service level agreements) on overall customer satisfaction. Further, this work also offers 
insights on how the impact of the antecedents on project performance and customer 
7satisfaction vary based on the duration or length of time that the project has stayed offshore, 
the type of project (e.g. development and maintenance projects or testing projects), and the 
class of software work (e.g. application development and maintenance or system software 
development and maintenance). This work uses structural equations modeling to test our 
hypotheses. 
We find that first, project management directly impacts customer satisfaction in 
projects that involve development and maintenance as compared to testing. Second, team 
stability is an important determinant of communication, project management, customer 
satisfaction and project performance. The role of team stability varies across the nature of the 
projects, and the context in which the project is considered. For example, we find that when 
projects have stayed offshore longer, team stability directly impacts customer satisfaction. 
However, when projects are relatively new, team stability directly impacts project 
performance, but not customer satisfaction. However, in both cases, the indirect effect is 
significant. Understanding these nuances can help manager’s better plan activities better, 
manage tasks more effectively and improve customer perceptions of offshore operations. One 
of the key messages of this research, apart from offering several insights to manage projects 
better is that a one size fits all approach to managing offshore projects does not work in 
satisfying customers, but managers need to consider the role of antecedents based on project 
type, project class and project duration to get better results.  
 
Internal perspective 
This perspective of the study addresses how managers can improve the productivity 
of individuals using two different strategies using software maintenance as the context.  
8In Chapter 3 of this dissertation titled “Individual Learning and Productivity in a 
Software Maintenance Environment: An Empirical Analysis,” we study the factors that drive 
learning and productivity in a software debugging environment. Using a panel dataset of 
engineers involved in performing debugging operations, we perform an empirical analysis of 
the determinants of learning and productivity to understand drivers of individual learning in 
the context of software debugging. Specifically, we investigate the role of individual level 
factors such as overall experience, task variety, novelty of task handled and team level 
factors such as team size, new hire and employee departures on individual productivity. Our 
analysis suggests that individuals learn from handling a variety of tasks. We also investigate 
the idea that individuals need a balance in exposure to task variety and task specialization. To 
operationalize this idea, we adapt the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the anti-trust 
literature in economics and use it as a measure of experience concentration. We investigate 
the role of collocation in teams and its impact on individual productivity in problem solving 
tasks. The findings in this essay will not only make theoretical contributions to the 
organizational learning and operations management literature, but they will also have 
implications for managers handling software projects – who often face situations of assigning 
individuals to multiple tasks. From a software manager’s perspective, this study offers 
considerable insights into managing task allocation within a team and understanding the 
implications of task allocation.  
In chapter 4 of this dissertation titled “Optimal resource allocation in Software 
Maintenance,” we investigate how the use of precious engineering resources can be 
optimized in a software debugging environment. This essay attempts to integrate econometric 
estimation procedures with traditional optimization methods in an attempt to provide 
9managers insights on planning capacity of teams and understanding the tradeoffs between the 
number of tasks waiting and team capacity. We show that managers can reduce wasted effort 
when bugs seemingly take a long period of time by closing or providing workarounds – and 
reinvest the time to resolve bugs that are more likely to get resolved. We motivate such 
actions by empirically demonstrating heterogeneity in the bug population and verifying that 
the probability of resolution reduces with time, and by showing that the loss in cumulative 
probability of resolution is minimal as compared to the gain in the reduction of overall 
waiting times in queue. We also estimate a heuristic measure to determine the capacity of 
teams in this environment. 
Data for this dissertation was obtained from a large Indian software services firm. The 
firm operates in more than 10 countries worldwide, employs more than 10,000 people and 
has upwards of $500 million in annual revenue. Most of the firms’ revenue is derived from 
the export of software services. A field visit to the sites of the firm was conducted in summer 
of 2005 preceding the data collection. Data for Chapter 2 comes from archival customer 
satisfaction survey data consisting of 677 projects. The overall dataset for chapters 3 and 4 
was drawn from debugging tasks performed by engineers in the context of software 
maintenance. More detail on the nature of the data used is described in the individual 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. Managing Offshore Software Projects: Antecedents of Project Performance and 
Customer Satisfaction 
2.1. Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed rapid advances in communication technologies, 
including the emergence of the Internet. These advances have enabled firms to leverage the 
variations in workforce skill sets, time, and cost structures across countries to create highly 
competitive global value chains (Swaminathan and Tayur 2003). As a result, outsourcing and 
offshoring of business processes has been a rising phenomenon over the last decade 
(Engardio 2006). The outsourcing of software work to offshore locations has been an integral 
part of this phenomenon. The estimated global demand for software based IT services was 
USD 382.1 billion in 2003, of which outsourced IT services comprised USD 118.2 billion 
(NASSCOM 2005). Increasingly, such outsourced activities are executed in offshore 
locations such as China and India. While the volume of such outsourcing has steadily 
increased, recent surveys suggest some dissatisfaction with vendor performance (McDougall 
2004; McEachern 2005). According to McEachen (2005): “Fifty-one percent of respondents 
reported terminating an outsourcing contract. On the satisfaction side, 62 percent of 
respondents said they were satisfied with their outsourcing relationships, down from 79 
percent a year ago.” This statement highlights the need to examine the drivers of project 
performance and customer satisfaction in offshore projects.  
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Against this backdrop, our work offers the following contributions. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the determinants of customer satisfaction 
and project performance in the offshore outsourcing context. Knowledge about the key 
drivers of customer satisfaction is crucial towards facilitating the appropriate allocation of 
resources in the management of offshore software projects. In the early stages of outsourcing, 
offshore service providers have focused primarily on issues related to technical performance, 
with only a secondary focus on project management. However, as the competitiveness of the 
outsourcing environment has steadily increased, these firms are now compelled to become 
more customer-focused. In that context, our work provides timely insights into what 
customers who outsource software projects are looking for, and how software service 
providers can deliver on those requirements. 
Second, while there is substantial work across disciplines on project management in 
general, little is known about how the internal operational variables involved in executing 
software projects work in tandem to drive the customer’s perceptions of project performance, 
and ultimately, customer satisfaction. In that sense, our work serves as a bridge that 
integrates insights from multiple disciplines including service operations, marketing, IT, and 
software engineering. We present and empirically test a model that links key antecedent 
variables under the control of the offshore project manager, such as team stability, 
communication effectiveness, and project management, and predicts their impact on the 
customer’s evaluations of project performance and overall customer satisfaction. We 
distinguish between the direct and the indirect effects of these antecedents and investigate 
how project-related contextual factors moderate these effects.  
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Despite a considerable amount of work on outsourcing in general (See Dibbern et al. 
(2004)), there is little empirical work on the determinants of performance outcomes in 
outsourcing. Lee and Kim (1999) examined the determinants of partnership quality and 
outsourcing success. They investigated strategic dimensions of outsourcing success such as 
participation, joint action between the teams and top management support. Lee et al. (2004) 
investigate the form of outsourcing strategy – the degree of outsourcing, allocation of control 
and performance period – on the measured dimensions of outsourcing success. However, 
these investigations look at performance outcomes in achieving economic, strategic and 
technological benefits from outsourcing (Lee et al. 2004; Lee and Kim 1999; Grover et al. 
1996). These papers do not investigate tactical issues of what determines project success in 
outsourced environments, but investigate relationship level determinants of outsourcing 
success. From a project execution perspective, the current empirical literature in the context 
of project execution in offshore outsourcing investigates issues that include capability 
building in outsourced projects (Ethiraj et al. 2005), determinants of contracting decisions in 
software projects (Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2005; Gopal et al. 2003), coordination in 
outsourced software projects (Gopal et al. 2002; Sabherwal 2003),  and investigating the role 
of communications and processes in offshore software development (Gopal et al. 2002).  
To summarize, there are two broad gaps in the literature on software outsourcing. First, 
while there have been numerous conceptual discussions and press articles on software 
outsourcing, the empirical literature on the performance determinants at the tactical level of 
outsourcing – in particular offshore outsourcing, is limited but for a few notable exceptions 
(e.g., Lee and Kim 1999; Lee et al. 2004; Ethiraj et al. 2005, Gopal et al. 2002, Gopal et al. 
2003). Second, there has been little work that has examined offshore outsourcing from an 
13
interdisciplinary, service management perspective that incorporates customers’ performance 
evaluations (e.g. Grover et al. 1996). Such a perspective is particularly useful in the 
outsourced software services context. For example, providing software services involves 
customization (Schmenner 1986; Stewart 2003), project management, and workforce 
allocation and management (Cook et al. 1999; Schmenner 1986) – this calls for insights from 
a service operations perspective. In addition, such services involve issues related to the 
design and development, testing, and ongoing maintenance of software products (Boehm 
1989) – this calls for insights from IT and software engineering perspectives. Finally, such 
services also involve frequent and deep customer involvement which introduces goal and 
outcome uncertainty (Chase 1978; Larsson and Bowen 1989), the careful management of 
customer expectations through ongoing communications (Berry et al. 1985) and the 
management of customer satisfaction – this calls for insights from a marketing perspective. 
 In §2, we develop the conceptual model, review relevant literature and outline our 
hypotheses. In §3, we describe the research design and validate the measurement model. In 
§4, we present the results. We discuss managerial implications and ideas for future research 
in §5.  
 
2.2. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 1 describes the conceptual model that underpins our analysis. Our hypotheses 
are summarized as follows: Better project performance leads to higher customer satisfaction 
(H1). Better project management leads to better project performance (H2) and higher 
customer satisfaction (H3). Better communication effectiveness leads to better project 
management (H4). Project management mediates the impact of communication effectiveness 
14
on project performance (H5). Better communication leads to higher customer satisfaction 
(H6). Higher team stability has a positive impact on project performance (H7), customer 
satisfaction  (H8), communication effectiveness (H9) and project management (H10). Project 
size has a nonlinear impact on project management (H11) and effective communication 
(H12). We use communication ability and communication intensity as indicators of effective 
communication. We now discuss the individual constructs and motivate the relationships 
outlined in the model. 
 
Figure 1 #  Conceptual Model and Hypothesized relationships 
 
Customer Satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction is the evaluative response of the customer to the services 
rendered by the provider (Wirtz and Bateson 1999). Higher customer satisfaction can lead to 
higher firm profits (Bolton 1998). However, satisfying customers is a challenging task for 
firms that provide custom software engineering services. Such services involve a high 
15
customer involvement in the service delivery process, high work complexity, uncertain 
outcomes and long service contact durations. In the specific context of offshore services, the 
physical and cultural distance between the customer and the service provider can complicate 
the relationship between them.  As noted by Stewart (2003), services are less likely to be 
successful when they involve intensive customization, complex tasks, remote performance 
and delivery (few tangibles), and contract workers who can be influenced only to a limited 
extent. Thus, understanding what drives customer satisfaction and managing those drivers is 
particularly important in the context of outsourced software services. 
Satisfaction has been modeled as a function of the gap between expectations and 
performance (Berry et al. 1988). However, in software services, expectations may be unclear 
and customer satisfaction may be based on subjective customer experiences with the 
delivered services (Grover et al. 1996). Direct, customer experience-based measures of 
satisfaction are appropriate in such scenarios (Rust et al. 1999). Such measures have been 
adopted in earlier customer satisfaction studies (Grover et al. 1996; Balasubramanian et al. 
2003; Krishnan and Ramaswamy 1999). 
 
Project Performance  
Consistent with the existing literature in software engineering (Deephouse et al. 1996; 
Nidumolu 1995), project performance measures output timeliness, output quality, and 
effective management of interim goals. Output timeliness and quality are both important 
components of the service-level agreements negotiated between the parties. Better product 
delivery can increase customer satisfaction in the service context (Bolton and Lemon 1999). 
Specifically in technology-intensive contexts, Krishnan and Ramaswamy (1999) found that 
16
the quality of financial statements and services provided in the banking industry were 
positively linked to customer satisfaction. Likewise, Balasubramanian et al. (2003) found that 
the operational competence of an online broker was associated with increased customer 
satisfaction. Building on these arguments: 
H1: Project performance positively influences customer satisfaction. 
 
Project Management 
 Project management in the outsourced service context covers the ability to plan and 
estimate work (Ethiraj et al. 2005), effectively demarcate and manage project priorities 
(Wallace et al. 2004), and manage project risks (Boehm 1989; Pressman 2005). Effective 
project management is crucial in the context of outsourced software development, because of 
the physical and cultural distance between customer and vendor. This distance implies that 
the mutual understanding and operational processes have to be in place to ensure that the 
project objectives are properly demarcated and those objectives are delivered in a timely 
manner. 
First, to scope out the project, the vendor must be able to plan and estimate the total 
inputs that are required for the project. Careful estimation is challenging because high 
customer involvement usually introduces significant uncertainty in tasks and goals (Larsson 
and Bowen 1989).  
Second, once the project is scoped out, demarcating and managing priorities, and 
resource allocation on an ongoing basis becomes important. Since software is an amorphous 
offering, there are many initiatives that managers and engineers can undertake at any point in 
time to make the offering even more function-rich, leading to “feature creep” (Brooks 1995). 
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Further, continuous customer interactions and shifting customer preferences can lead to 
substantial uncertainty in the scope of the project. Correspondingly, managers must be 
capable of scheduling resource allocations at short notice and shifting allocations of 
resources across time to deal with shifting project scope (Slocum and Sims 1980).  
Finally, the intangibility and continuous evolution of software products increase the risks 
associated with successful design and development (see Barki et al. 1993 for a summary). 
Software development involves a high degree of risk for three reasons: First, unlike 
manufacturing, each software project is one-of-a-kind, with no standard (material) prototype 
that can be tweaked. Second, changes in the external user environment imply that software 
designed to fit the user’s needs at some previous point in time will rarely fit perfectly with 
the user’s needs at the time it is released. Third, the gap between the technical knowledge of 
the product designer and the domain knowledge of the user is particularly large in the context 
of software. For example, a programmer may be expert at building a standard billing system, 
but the billing system requirements may vary sharply across a hotel, an airline, and an online 
auction site.  
Given these challenges, the lack of sound project management in software projects 
has often led to projects that “came in years behind schedule, exceeded their budget by 
millions, and failed to meet their users' needs even if completed eventually”(Nidumolu 1995, 
p.192). In contrast, good project management skills involve effective work planning and 
estimation, task prioritization, and risk management can improve perceived project 
performance (Nidumolu 1995). Building on these arguments:   
H2: Project management positively influences project performance. 
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When customers evaluate services, they evaluate not just the final outcome but the 
series of encounters that lead up to that outcome – in fact, the process may play a greater role 
than the final outcome in determining overall customer satisfaction (Brown and Swartz 1989; 
Danaher and Mattsson 1994).  Interaction with customers during the ongoing service delivery 
process is particularly important in the context of outsourced software development because 
the priorities, requirements, and the emerging issues in a project are often unclear to both the 
customer and the service provider. Good project management practices help in resolving goal 
and process uncertainties by getting customers on board early, and keeping them involved in 
the project at various stages (Stewart 2003). The effort that customers may invest in 
interacting with the service provider and guiding the development process can increase 
customer satisfaction on account of self-attribution effects (Konana and Balasubramanian 
2005) and on account of customer reassurance that the service provider is sensitive to and 
accommodating their evolving needs (Youngdahl and Kellogg 1997).  
Further, for most tangible products, the management of the development process is 
invisible from the customer’s perspective. However, in the software services context, the 
customer who continuously interacts with the service provider is able to observe the 
implementation of behavioral and outcome controls that are part of good project management 
(Nidumolu and Subramani 2003). Further, the positive implications of effective work 
planning and estimation, task prioritization, and risk management initiatives employed by the 
service provider are transparent to such a customer. Building on these arguments:   
H3:  Project management positively influences customer satisfaction. 
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Communication Effectiveness 
In the offshore software development context, effective communications are 
particularly important on account of the lack of frequent face-to-face encounters, time zone 
differences, and the cultural divides between the involved parties (Wright 2005). Poor 
communication has often frustrated managers involved with offshore services, as illustrated 
by the following practitioner quote:  
“…communication among the project team members is more difficult, more time-consuming, 
and therefore more costly. Conference calls take longer, information is misunderstood, and 
email volume increases. Even worse, poor communication is one aspect of any outsourcing 
relationship that will doom it to failure” (Clifton 2005). 
The purpose of effective communication is to keep the customer informed about project 
activities. Effective communication in the offshore context involves two distinct facets. First, 
the service provider has to provide frequent, timely, and complete reports of project progress 
to the customer. Second, and more generally, in the absence of face-to-face contact, the 
service provider has to effectively articulate issues, many of which are technically complex 
and prone to multiple interpretations, through oral and written communication. Accordingly, 
to capture communication effectiveness, we use two second order constructs to separately 
capture project reporting performance (“communication intensity”) and the ability of the 
offshore engineers to communicate (“communication ability”). First, communication 
intensity measures the frequency and quality of project status reports sent to the customer. In 
the existing literature, researchers have used proxy measures to capture parallel constructs.2
Second, communication ability measures the ability of the offshore counterparts to articulate 
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issues when interacting through conference calls or emails. Such oral and written 
communication skills have been recognized as pivotal inputs into effective software project 
management (Curtis et al. 1988; Nidumolu 1995), particularly in the context of offshore 
operations (Apte et al. 1997).  
Effective communications can affect multiple variables in our model. At one level, 
effective communications can enhance customer perceptions of good project management 
(Boehm 1981; Gopal et al. 2002). Here, first, effective communications can help in better 
work planning and estimation. Specifically, by communicating frequently and effectively 
with the customer, the software developer can obtain a clear idea about the needs of the 
customer and about the level, kind, and temporal scheduling of resources that would be 
required to meet those needs. Second, frequent and effective communications help the 
developer keep track of the shifting priorities of customers, and help align development 
resources to be responsive to the short-term requirements of the customers. This is 
particularly important in the software development context, where day-to-day fire fighting to 
address unexpected software bugs and implementation problems have to be coordinated with 
longer term development and enhancement work. Third, frequent and effective 
communications can help keep the gap between the current state of the project and the 
customer’s desired project trajectory low. Customers who are constantly informed about 
surprises and advances in the software development process can provide quick feedback and 
useful inputs into further stages of development. Building on these arguments:   
H4:  Communication effectiveness positively influences project management. 
 
2 Other variables that reflect the degree of project-related coordination and communication include the total 
number of onsite customer employees the software development team has to interact with, and the frequency of 
21
Better communications anchors superior project management, which, in turn can 
affect project performance (i.e., the quality and timeliness of delivered products, as seen from 
the customer’s perspective).  Nidumolu (1995) finds that the effect of communication on 
project performance is mediated by project risk, which in our model is controlled by superior 
project management.  Likewise, in the financial services industry, Lievens and Moenaert 
(2000) find that uncertainty reduction mediates the impact of communication on project 
success. Building on these arguments: 
H5: Communication effectiveness positively influences project performance, and this 
influence is mediated by project management. 
 
Finally, communication can directly impact customer satisfaction in two ways. First, 
effective communications can influence how the customer evaluates different aspects of the 
software development process and can help in the ongoing management of customer 
expectations. This can increase the customer’s satisfaction with the procedures involved in 
software development. Effective communications can also influence how the customer 
evaluates the final delivered product, so that the positive aspects are highlighted and the 
negative aspects muted. Correspondingly, effective communications can enhance the overall 
quality of delivered services as perceived by the customer (Berry et al. 1985; Garvin 1988; 
Lengnick-Hall 1996)  
Second, effective communications can reduce task uncertainty (Sitkin et al. 1994). 
Software is ultimately a “credence” good whose properties must be discovered through post-
implementation experience with the finished product. However, effective communication 
during development can create confidence in the customer that the vendor is on track with 
 
meetings between the customer and service provider (e.g., Gopal et al. 2002, Deephouse et al. 1996). 
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development and that the customer’s needs are being recognized and accommodated in the 
software design. The resulting feeling of reassurance is extremely important in a context 
where the development activity is taking place in a distant and unfamiliar location over 
which the customer has no day-to-day control. Building on these arguments: 
H6:  Communication effectiveness positively influences customer satisfaction. 
 
Team Stability 
This construct measures perceptions of the length of time software engineers stay in 
the project, and the effectiveness of the offshore team in managing work without disruption 
in case of turnover. Engineer turnover has been a specific area of concern in offshore 
software projects (Gopal et al. 2003). Turnover in a project can happen either on account of 
resignation or reassignment to another project. Resignations are common in a booming 
industry where software service providers routinely poach each other’s talent. Intra-firm 
transfers happen because offshore software service providers often reassign experienced 
engineers to guide startup projects or to manage other, new high-profile projects that the firm 
has taken on. Alternatively, engineers who are bored with a project or seek a change in work 
profile to widen their portfolio of skills may themselves seek to be reassigned. In a survey of 
104 Indian software firms that was conducted even at an early phase of the outsourcing 
phenomenon, 89 firms listed the shortage of skilled labor and 71 firms listed employee 
turnover as one of top three business problems they face (Arora et al. 1999). 
Loss of experienced employees leads to reduction in productivity and decrease in 
project performance (Abdel-Hamed 1989; Oliva and Sterman 2001). Further, the long lead 
times associated with hiring new engineers, training them and bringing them up to speed on 
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the customer’s project compounds the problems related to maintaining productivity and work 
output quality. Building on these arguments: 
H7: Team stability positively influences project performance. 
 
Apart from the pursuit of cost savings, the high demand for and turnover of IT 
personnel within the U.S. has been cited as a key driver of offshore outsourcing initiatives 
(Carmel and Agarwal 2000). Consequently, customer firms that have outsourced software 
development and maintenance have been particularly sensitive to turnover in the ranks of the 
service providers themselves. These firms have often faced the situation where they pay for 
an engineer to learn about their systems and software, only to have that engineer leave the 
service provider in search of more promising opportunities soon after the “breaking in” 
period is completed (Overby 2003).  
In the light of these negative consequences, reducing and managing turnover to 
minimize productivity and information losses is a priority for the service provider. High 
turnover can displease customers particularly when key contact people at the service provider 
leave – in fact, the relationship between the customer and selected employees who work for 
the service provider may at times be stronger than the relationship between the customer and 
service provider at an institutional level (Czepiel 1990; Gwinner et al. 2005).3 While 
customers often prefer to deal with specific employees, customer satisfaction may be 
maintained by ensuring that the project team itself offers a stable set of competencies and 
knowledge to the customer. In that case, the negative implications of the transition of a single 
employee or a few employees are minimized. Initiatives that can help in this context include 
 
3 According to Tax and Brown (1998) American Express estimated that 30% of the customers of a typical 
financial advisor within the company would move with him or her to a competing firm. 
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the rotation of key employees, use of teams that comprise individuals with overlapping skill 
sets to service customers, and use of multiple contact points within the team (Bendapudi and 
Leone 2002). In the offshore software services context, the service providers tend to 
negotiate with customers regarding acceptable replacements for employees who are leaving 
the project teams. The negotiation process leads to building of trust in the service provider 
and confidence that continuity and stability will be maintained in the ongoing project. In 
general, customers are less dissatisfied if they consider the replacement to be acceptable and 
have input into the replacement process (Bendapudi and Leone 2002).  
While the arguments above establish the importance of team stability in the offshore 
software services context, two studies have specifically examined the link between employee 
turnover and customer behavior. In a study of turnover at a fast food chain, 20% of the 
outlets with the lowest employee turnover rates brought in double the sales and 55% higher 
profits than the 20% of stores with the highest turnover rates (Heskett et al. 1994). Likewise, 
in a study of convenience stores, a lowering of the employee turnover rates when levels of 
employee turnover were relatively low yielded significant improvements in customer 
satisfaction (Estelami and Hurley 2003). Building on these arguments: 
H8: Team stability positively influences customer satisfaction. 
In the context of offshore outsourcing, cultural differences between the service 
providers and customers can lead to communication problems (Kobayashi-Hillary 2005; 
Wright 2005). To facilitate effective communication, engineers in offshore software 
development firms are put though a training phase that enables them to understand the 
prevailing technology in use, the social etiquettes followed within both their own 
organization and customers organizations, and the native culture of the customer (Abdel-
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Hamed 1989). The cross-cultural component of such training aims to improve 
communication skills by creating appropriate perceptions about the customer’s culture (Black 
and Mendenhall 1990). However, such skills are seldom developed well during a short 
training course or in a formal learning environment. Learning about and becoming 
comfortable with the customer culture and developing the communication proficiency that 
fits in well with that culture takes time and experience (Torbiron 1982).   
Specifically in the offshore context, new engineers who join the team take time to 
learn intricacies of communicating with customers. Communication skills in this context do 
not just include the ability to understand and operate in a different culture. In parallel, what is 
also called for is the ability to communicate in a mutually understandable technical language 
that reflects knowledge about the software application domain and the way that domain maps 
into the software design (Curtis et al. 1988). Consequently, effective communication is 
disrupted when experienced engineers leave and new engineers join the project team. 
Building on these arguments: 
H9: Team stability positively influences communication effectiveness. 
 
The stability of the project team can affect the quality of project management as well. 
When teams are stable, the software service provider can adhere to planned estimates and 
execute work without disruption, and better manage the changes in requirements and 
priorities – this enables superior project management (Abdel-Hamed 1989). When turnover is 
high, a key reason for the disruption of work planning is that there is limited information 
within the team on the new entrants’ capabilities (Höffler and Sliwka 2002) – this leads to 
non-optimal work allocation and incorrect performance expectations. Second, the 
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demarcation and management of project priorities is affected because team members, 
especially senior team members and managers, need to provide constant attention and 
guidance to the new entrants to help them quickly move up the learning curve (Chapman 
1998). Further, the knowledge resident in the departing team members has to be documented 
and absorbed by others within the team. This is often a time-consuming task, given that a 
large fraction of the useful knowledge in software development is of a tacit nature. Finally, 
turnover decreases the project team’s ability to recognize and manage sources of risk. New 
team members are typically slower than experienced ones in identifying problems at an early 
stage of development, and are less capable of taking remedial action that will resolve the 
problem at that early stage. Consequently, projects with high turnover are more likely to not 
meet their goals, be late, and suffer cost overruns (Abdel-Hamed 1989). Building on these 
arguments: 
H10: Team stability is positively associated with superior project management 
 
Control Variable: Team Size 
The size of the project team can influence some of the constructs discussed above. 
We measure size as the total person months of effort expended on the project. While the 
number of employees associated with the project provides an alternative measure of size 
(e.g., Kraut and Streeter 1995), the metric we employ accounts for additions and attrition to 
the team over time, as well as the total effort input by employees into the project. Our field 
research showed that for very small projects that involve two or three employees, the tasks 
related to communication and project management were typically not well-defined. Instead, 
clients tended to dictate project needs on a task oriented basis. Employees in very small 
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projects tended to focus more on day-to-day tasks and deadlines, making project 
management and communication harder. As the project size increases, the project lends itself 
to the imposition of greater structure and is better defined while still being manageable. This 
can help with improving communications, project tracking, and task estimation. However, as 
projects grow much larger, both communication and project management can become more 
difficult.  For example, an empirical study of large projects revealed that employees found it 
easier to manage tasks when there were a smaller number of people involved (Curtis et al. 
1988). With smaller project teams, a sub-group of team members can direct its work and 
closely track and manage project implementation (Kraut and Streeter 1995).  With an 
increase in team size, the need for coordination and communication both within and outside 
the team can increase sharply, thereby decreasing the quality of project management and 
communications (Brooks 1995). As one programmer noted (Curtis et al. 1988, p. 1279): “In 
the beginning it was easy to keep track of what was going on. It was only after reaching the 
critical mass…that things began falling into cracks and we were losing track.” Building on 
these arguments:  
 H11: Project size has an inverted-U shaped influence on project management. 
 H12: Project size has an inverted-U shaped influence on communication 
effectiveness.   
 
2.3. Research Design 
Research Setting and Data  
Our dataset comes from a large, export-oriented, India-based software services 
company. We began the research with on-site field work conducted over two months at the 
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company’s operating sites in India.  This immersion, which included interviews with 
company managers, helped us obtain an insider’s view of the operation of outsourced 
offshore software projects.  
Our unit of analysis is an offshore project team that provides software development, 
maintenance, and testing services to U.S.-based customers. Our data are sourced from 
projects that were executed from multiple sites of the software services provider. Our sample 
consists of 677 usable surveys filled in by U.S.-based managers employed by the customer 
who coordinated the offshore projects. These surveys evaluated services rendered by the 
offshore team over a 6-month span. The surveys captured perceptual ratings of the constructs 
discussed in §2 using 5-point Likert scales with 1 indicating strong disagreement, and 5 
indicating strong agreement (see Appendix for survey items). As feedback was submitted for 
over 95% of the projects undertaken, non-response bias is not an issue.  
The projects in our dataset can be classified in three ways. First, based on the nature 
of the task, projects could be classified into “Maintenance and Development” (M&D) or 
“Testing” projects. M&D projects involve fixing bugs, enhancing existing software features, 
and adding new features. Testing projects involve verification testing (automated testing 
procedure to ensure that bugs fixed in an existing software release did not disrupt other parts 
of the code) and test automation services (producing software test suites for new modules on 
which automated verification testing can be performed). Second, based on the type of 
software involved, projects could be classified as “System software” or “Application 
software” projects. The former runs close to and interacts with the hardware, while the latter 
runs on top of the system software. The skill sets involved in designing and managing 
systems and application software tend to be distinct. Finally, projects can be classified on the 
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basis of duration. Projects with a functional duration of less than 2 years were classified as 
low age and those with more than 2 years were classified as high age projects. This 
classification was based on the field research and insights from the practitioner literature 
(Kaka and Sinha 2005). The maximum age of the project was close to 8 years since 
inception. The minimum age of the project in the dataset was 2 months. 
 
Scale Validity and Reliability 
Our final item list had 13 items, excluding an overall customer satisfaction measure 
(see Table 1 for items). We first performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using 
varimax rotation on all survey items other than the overall satisfaction measure. The 12 items 
yielded five factors – these are labeled as Communication Ability, Communication Intensity, 
Project Management, Project Performance and Team Stability (see Tables 1 and 2). The five 
items together accounted for 74.2% of the total variance in the data. Subsequent EFA 
conducted separately on the M&D project data (381 surveys) and Testing project data (296 
surveys) revealed consistent underlying factor structures.  
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then performed on the factors that emerged from 
the EFA, applying a Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) estimator to correct for 
multivariate non-normality (using LISREL 8.72). All the data, including the combined 
dataset and subsets of the data described fit the model well (see Table 3), and the loadings of 
the indicators on each of the constructs were significant for each dataset. Further, as detailed 
in Table 1, each construct in the combined dataset had a Cronbach’s alpha that was well over 
the 0.70 criterion (Nunnally 1978).  
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Finally, following Venkatraman (1989) and Sethi and King (1994), we tested the 
constructs for discriminant validity by comparing an unconstrained model with each pair of 
constructs grouped together and a model with the covariance between the two constructs 
constrained to unity. A significant difference in Chi-Square between the models indicated 
that the constructs were distinct (see Table 4). Overall, these findings suggest that the 
measurement model performs well. 
 
Construct Items Alpha 
a)  Work planning and estimation 
b)  Managing changes in project 
schedules/priorities Project Management 
c)  Risk identification and management 
0.82 
d) Overall Quality of delivery 
e) Overall Timeliness of delivery Project performance 
f)  Managing interim Goals 
0.78 
g)  Quality of status reports Communication 
Intensity h)  Timeliness of reports 
0.809 
i)  Oral communication ability 
Communication Quality 
j)  Written communication ability 
0.785 
k) Satisfactory duration of stay of engineers 
in team 
Team Stability 
l)  Satisfactory management of transitions 
within  team 
0.805 
Table 1 # Scale and Reliability measures using combined data 
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Project 
Management 
Project 
Performance 
Communication 
Intensity 
Communication 
Ability 
Team 
Stability 
a) 0.7728 0.3372 0.2107 0.1143 0.0886 
b) 0.7172 0.1596 0.3124 0.2996 0.1729 
c) 0.7012 0.2413 0.1419 0.311 0.1637 
d) 0.3484 0.6687 0.072 0.2368 0.1471 
e) 0.5364 0.6532 0.1442 0.0665 0.1523 
f) 0.1443 0.8025 0.24 0.1495 0.1915 
g) 0.2815 0.1208 0.832 0.2063 0.1144 
h) 0.1704 0.2179 0.8339 0.2485 0.0794 
i) 0.2189 0.1338 0.2054 0.8625 0.0746 
j) 0.2744 0.2341 0.3091 0.7338 0.143 
k) 0.1214 0.1414 0.0707 0.039 0.884 
l) 0.1434 0.1647 0.101 0.1403 0.8507 
Table 2 # Factor loadings for Combined Data 
 
Sample 
Size 
CHI - 
Square DF RMSEA NFI IFI RFI GFI 
Combined Data 677 93.74 44 0.049 0.985 0.99 0.978 0.971 
Maintenance and 
Development 381 71.61 44 0.04 0.978 0.988 0.967 0.962 
Testing 296 64.86 44 0.04 0.979 0.989 0.969 0.952 
Systems Software 450 72.109 44 0.0377 0.984 0.991 0.977 0.966 
Application 
Software 227 71.55 44 0.052 0.965 0.981 0.948 0.938 
Table 3 # Results of CFA analysis for the classifications 
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Table 4 # Difference in chi square from a constrained model with covariance 1 and free model 
2.4. Analysis and Results 
Analysis Methodology 
We used a structural equations model to validate our hypotheses. We analyzed the 
covariance matrix of the combined data (N = 677) using LISREL 8.72. While most of the 
variables displayed either insignificant or only moderate kurtosis, an examination of 
multivariate kurtosis indicated a high Mardia’s coefficient of 90.03. We used the Satorra-
Bentler scaled Chi-Square and a Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) estimator to correct 
for the downward bias in standard error – this is the most reliable correction for non-
normality (Boomsma and Hoogland 2001; West et al. 1995). An alternative correction 
approach is to use an Asymptotic Distribution Free (ADF) estimator. A simulation study 
conducted by Olsson et al. (2000) compared maximum likelihood, Generalized least squares 
 Constrained Model 
Unconstrained 
Model 
DF 
Difference 
CHI-
Square 
Difference
P-Value
Project Management with 
Project Performance 194.00 38.89 1 155.11 <.001 
Team Stability 174.39 1.59 1 172.80 <.001 
Communication Intensity 172.30 3.20 1 169.10 <.001 
Communication Ability 174.07 5.21 1 168.86 <.001 
Project Performance with 
Team Stability 205.68 4.65 1 201.03 <.001 
Communication Intensity 207.16 5.75 1 201.41 <.001 
Communication Ability 302.54 6.14 1 296.40 <.001 
Team Stability with 
Communication Intensity 357.52 0.00 1 357.52 <.001 
Communication Ability 368.86 0.05 1 368.81 <.001 
Communication 
Intensity with  
Communication Ability 264.80 1.24 1 263.56 <.001 
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(GLS) and ADF estimators. They concluded that maximum likelihood is most robust to 
specification errors and non-normality. ADF estimators yield unbiased estimates and 
approached ML estimators in performance only with sample sizes of over 1000 observations. 
Therefore, we use the RML estimator. 
Combined Data Results 
Descriptive statistics for the combined data set (N=677) are provided in Table 5. All 
item-to-construct R-squares are greater than 50% (see Table 5). Table 6 details the multiple 
R-Squares of the endogenous constructs – note that 71.52% of the variance in customer 
satisfaction is explained by the model. Estimation results for the combined data and other 
sub-classifications of the data are detailed in Table 7. The estimated model has an RMSEA of 
less than 0.05 across the data classifications, indicating good model fit (MacCallum et al. 
1996). All the comparative fit indices are greater than 0.9 across the classifications, again 
indicating good fit (compared to independence model). Indirect and the total effects between 
constructs, and the significance of the corresponding paths are reported in Tables 8 and 94.
Focusing first on the results for the combined data set, we find that project 
performance had a significant positive impact on customer satisfaction (i.e., H1 is supported). 
Project management had a significant positive impact on project performance and customer 
satisfaction (i.e., H2 and H3 are supported). Project management had a direct (positive) 
impact on customer satisfaction, and also an indirect impact on customer satisfaction through 
project performance. Stated differently, developing project management capabilities appears 
to improve project performance, and hence customer satisfaction. Increased customer 
satisfaction has been associated in past literature with increased customer retention and 
34
profits. This supports the notion that project management capability drives firm profits in 
offshore software development (Ethiraj et al. 2005). 
Next, we find that communication effectiveness has a significant, positive impact on 
project management (i.e., H4 is supported), and this effect holds across all data 
classifications. Further, project management fully mediates the impact of communication 
effectiveness on project performance across all data classifications (i.e., H5 is supported). 
Other empirical findings in the literature have also revealed the lack of a direct effect of 
communication on project performance (Deephouse et al. 1996). However, a similar 
mediated effect is found by Nidumolu (1995), who finds that the effect of horizontal 
coordination (oral communication, written communication, scheduled and unscheduled group 
meetings) on project performance is fully mediated by residual risk. Further, we did not find 
a significant direct impact of communication effectiveness on customer satisfaction (i.e., H6 
is not supported) – however, its indirect effect through project management and project 
performance is positive and significant across all the data classifications (see Table 8).  
 
4 Based on the modification indices generated by the estimation, we allow for free inter-item correlation 
between work planning and estimation, and the timeliness of delivery across datasets. 
35
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n)
Plan (a) 1.000
Prioritize (b) 0.623 1.000
Manage Risk (c ) 0.579 0.619 1.000
Delivery quality (d) 0.514 0.457 0.513 1.000
Delivery Timeliness (e) 0.658 0.558 0.514 0.569 1.000
Interim goals (f) 0.462 0.460 0.470 0.476 0.591 1.000
Status Rep Quality (g) 0.447 0.527 0.442 0.344 0.370 0.389 1.000
Status rep timeliness (h) 0.428 0.492 0.406 0.374 0.388 0.390 0.686 1.000
Oral ability (i) 0.399 0.508 0.452 0.363 0.347 0.340 0.456 0.454 1.000
Written ability (j) 0.484 0.554 0.516 0.434 0.439 0.419 0.509 0.542 0.652 1.000
Duration of Stay (k) 0.245 0.295 0.282 0.297 0.318 0.309 0.215 0.203 0.184 0.242 1.000
Transition (l) 0.305 0.332 0.326 0.319 0.344 0.356 0.263 0.249 0.245 0.331 0.620 1.000
Overall Satisfaction (m) 0.599 0.625 0.577 0.632 0.641 0.581 0.449 0.492 0.419 0.513 0.388 0.462 1.000
Project Size (log) (n) 0.056 0.094 0.067 0.015 0.045 0.037 0.026 0.107 0.045 0.018 -0.077 -0.006 0.071 1.000
Mean 4.423 4.586 4.323 4.481 4.536 4.292 4.573 4.661 4.419 4.599 4.179 4.226 4.543 3.236
Stdev 0.640 0.587 0.682 0.606 0.622 0.705 0.596 0.514 0.617 0.537 0.827 0.804 0.577 0.844
R-Square 0.577 0.664 0.578 0.523 0.616 0.502 0.687 0.686 0.561 0.757 0.547 0.703
Table 5 # Item statistics and correlation matrix
Communication Effectiveness 0.2215
Communication Intensity 0.6798
Communication Ability 0.7841
Overall Satisfaction 0.7152
Project Performance 0.7578
Project Management 0.7818
Table 6 # R-Square for the endogenous constructs
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Combined M&D Testing Application System 
Low 
Duration 
High 
Duration 
Sample Size 677 381 296 227 450 242 435 
H1 0.667*** 0.579*** 0.764*** 0.547*** 0.714*** 0.631*** 0.771** 
H2 0.741*** 0.839*** 0.644*** 0.649*** 0.783*** 0.668*** 0.797*** 
H3 0.285** 0.626** -0.035 0.307 0.301 0.316 0.193 
H4 1.217*** 1.124*** 1.284*** 1.083*** 1.292*** 1.377*** 1.146*** 
H5 0.903*** 0.944*** 0.827*** 0.704*** 1.013*** 0.921*** 0.915*** 
H6 -0.063 -0.440 0.364** 0.120 -0.220 -0.101 -0.017 
H7 0.131** 0.078* 0.194** 0.234*** 0.082* 0.224** 0.071* 
H8 0.097** 0.097** 0.073 0.082 0.141*** 0.063 0.108** 
H9 0.233*** 0.184*** 0.288*** 0.226***  0.235*** 0.245*** 0.209*** 
H10 0.095** 0.110** 0.080 0.145** 0.064 0.019 0.149*** 
H11 -0.292** -0.099 -0.377** -0.179 -0.303** -0.192 -0.213 
H11a† 0.050** 0.019 0.061** 0.029 0.053** 0.024 0.044** 
H12 0.265** 0.409** 0.179 0.056 0.331** 0.084 0.313** 
H12a†† -0.036** -0.066** -0.020 -0.007 -0.044** -0.005 -0.046** 
From MI 0.055*** 0.053** 0.057** 0.029** 0.066*** 0.092 0.035*** 
Chi-Square 98.440 80.839 107.694 96.307 80.982 101.682 98.399 
DF 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
RMSEA 0.022  0.015 0.039 0.0365 0.014 0.039 0.027 
NFI 0.991 0.985 0.982 0.974 0.990 0.977 0.986 
RFI 0.988 0.979 0.975 0.963 0.985 0.968 0.980 
CFI 0.997 0.998 0.994 0.993 0.999 0.993 0.996 
GFI 0.977 0.967 0.944 0.938 0.972 0.937 0.967 
NNFI 0.997 0.998 0.992 0.991 0.998 0.991 0.995 
Table 7 # Fit indices and Direct effect estimates for the individual categories of dataset 
 
†non-linear coefficient for H11 to test the nonlinearity hypotheses 
†† nonlinear coefficient for H12 to test the nonlinearity hypotheses 
 
* Significant at <0.1 
**Significant at <0.05 
 ***Significant at <0.001 
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Table 8 # Indirect effects between the latent variables
* Significant at <0.1
**Significant at <0.05
***Significant at <0.001
Indirect effects between the latent variables
Combined M&D Testing Low Age High Age System Application
Communication Effectiveness  Project Performance 0.903*** 0.944*** 0.827*** 0.920*** 0.914*** 1.013*** 0.703***
Communication Effectiveness  Customer Satisfaction 0.950*** 1.252*** 0.587*** 1.016*** 0.926*** 1.113*** 0.718***
Team Stability  Project Management 0.284*** 0.207*** 0.370*** 0.337*** 0.240*** 0.304*** 0.245***
Team Stability  Project Performance 0.281*** 0.267*** 0.290*** 0.239*** 0.310*** 0.289*** 0.254***
Team Stability  Customer Satisfaction 0.369*** 0.318*** 0.460*** 0.380*** 0.366*** 0.325*** 0.415***
Project Management  Customer Satisfaction 0.495*** 0.486*** 0.493*** 0.421*** 0.615** 0.560*** 0.355**
Project Size  Project Performance 0.022 0.303** -0.094 -0.050 0.116 0.097 -0.076
Project Size square  Project Performance 0.004 -0.046* 0.022 0.011 -0.007 -0.003 0.013
Project Size  Project Management 0.322** 0.460** 0.231* 0.116 0.359** 0.428** 0.061
Project Size square  Project Management -0.044** -0.074** -0.026 -0.007 -0.052** -0.057** -0.007
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Table 9 # Total effects between the latent variables
* Significant at <0.1
**Significant at <0.05
***Significant at <0.001
Total effects between the latent variables
Combined M&D Testing Low Age High Age System Application
Communication Effectiveness  Project Performance 0.903*** 0.944*** 0.827*** 0.920*** 0.914*** 1.013*** 0.703***
Communication Effectiveness  Customer Satisfaction 0.886*** 0.811*** 0.951*** 0.915*** 0.909*** 0.893*** 0.838***
Team Stability  Project Management 0.379*** 0.318*** 0.450*** 0.357*** 0.389*** 0.369*** 0.391***
Team Stability  Project Performance 0.413*** 0.345*** 0.485*** 0.463*** 0.382*** 0.371*** 0.488***
Team Stability  Customer Satisfaction 0.466*** 0.415*** 0.533*** 0.444*** 0.474*** 0.466*** 0.498***
Project Management  Customer Satisfaction 0.781*** 1.114*** 0.457*** 0.738*** 0.808*** 0.861*** 0.663***
Project Size  Project Performance 0.022 0.303** -0.094 -0.050 0.116 0.097 -0.076
Project Size square  Project Performance 0.004 -0.046* 0.022 0.011 -0.007 -0.003 0.013
Project Size  Project Management 0.030 0.361** -0.146 -0.075 0.145 0.124 -0.118
Project Size square  Project Management 0.006 -0.055* 0.035 0.017 -0.008 -0.004 0.021
Project Size  Customer Satisfaction 0.006 0.222 -0.001 -0.064 0.112 0.034 -0.071
Project Size square  Customer Satisfaction 0.007 -0.032 0.008 0.013 -0.006 0.006 0.013
Project Size  Communication Effectiveness 0.265** 0.409** 0.179 0.084 0.313** 0.331** 0.056
Project Size square  Communication Effectiveness -0.037** -0.066** -0.020 -0.005 -0.046** -0.044** -0.007
38 
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As hypothesized, the effects of team stability on project performance (H7), customer 
satisfaction (H8), communication effectiveness (H9) and project management (H10) were 
positive and significant.  
Counter to our original hypotheses of an inverted-U shaped effect of project size on 
project management (H11), we find a U shaped effect.5 A possible, ex-post explanation that 
must be considered exploratory in nature is as follows. Our field research revealed that with 
very small project teams in the offshore context, project management responsibility was 
shared across multiple projects by a single offshore project manager.  In such cases, the 
offshore project manager tends to develop deep skills in managing multiple, small projects. 
However, as the project size increases, the ability of this single offshore leader to focus 
sufficient attention and resources on any given project decreases—this leads to a 
deterioration in how tightly the project is managed. However, as the project grows in size, a 
dedicated team manager is allocated to that project team. This may lead to a more systematic 
and disciplined approach to work planning, resource allocation, and risk management, 
thereby enabling a tighter overall management of the project. This reasoning would explain 
the U-shaped effect of project size on project management. The indirect effect of project size 
on project management through communication effectiveness is significant and in the 
expected direction. Finally, we find support for the hypotheses that project size has an 
inverted U shaped effect on perceived communication effectiveness (H12).  
Finally, Table 10 shows a comparison of the coefficient estimates of our work with 
comparative software studies. It also displays the context in which the referred research was 
 
5 We used a log transform of the project size. First, this allows the size variable to be similarly scaled as the 
other indicators. Second, this normalizes the size variable and reduces the level of multivariate non-normality in 
the data. 
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carried out. While one must acknowledge that it is not an apple to apple to comparison, it 
does carry some value as we may infer from the following discussion. First, as seen in Table 
10, one straight forward inference that we can draw is that team stability has not been 
considered in past literature. Next, our results match the results found in other outsourcing 
studies where the investigation is in non-offshore specific contexts. Of specific interest in 
Table 10 is the lack of strong correlation between communication and residual risk as 
reported by Nidumolu (1995) as opposed to a strong correlation as found in our data. As 
Nidumolu’s research context was not offshore, this may point to better project management 
abilities required in the offshore software development context. In similar vein, Nidumolu 
and Subramani (2003) did not find any effect of the standardization of processes on the 
performance of the project while we find a direct impact of project management (a proxy for 
standardization) on project performance, again reinforcing the need for effective project 
management skills in offshore environment. This is also consistent with findings of Ethiraj et 
al. (2005) who find that project management is a significant capability that offshore software 
developers need to manage and develop.  
 Other interesting results show that the quality of deliverables was not significantly 
associated with client satisfaction in Kraut and Streeter (1995) while we find a significant 
association. Further, we found a nonlinear effect of project size on communication and on 
project management as opposed to a linear effect in other related literatures such as Kraut 
and Streeter (1995). Finally, our investigation of the non-linear effect of project size on 
project management has not been investigated in the literature and the results show a 
counterintuitive effect that is consistent with some of the insights that we obtained from the 
managers on the field. 
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Customer
Satisfaction Project Management Project Performance
Customer
Satisfaction N/A This link has not been directly studied
(-) 0.11 (0.850***) (Client satisfaction and Software quality -
Kraut and Streeter 1995) - non offshore context
SOFTWARE
Project
Management
N/A
0.702* (0.658***) (Elapsed time in project to Technical
Processes, Gopal et al. 2002) - offshore context SOFTWARE
(-) .20 (0.741***) (Standardization of Methods to
Development Process performance, Nidumolu and Subramani
2003) - non offshore context SOFTWARE
0.791** ( 0.658***) (Meeting Targets and Planning -
Deephouse et al. 1996) - Non offshore context SOFTWARE
0.228* (0.514***) (Overall Quality and Planning - Deephouse
et al. 1996) - Non offshore context SOFTWARE
(-) 0.54*** (0.741***)† (Residual Risk and Project
performance -- Nidumolu 1995) - Non offshore context
SOFTWARE
Project
Performance N/A
Communication
Team Stability
Team Size
Table 10 # Comparison of estimates from common model with similar work in software or services domain6
6 Standardized and unstandardized coefficients are compared where appropriate
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Communication Team Stability Project Size
Customer
Satisfaction
0.610*** (0.886***) (Coordination Success and Client
Satisfaction - Kraut and Streeter 1995) non offshore
context SOFTWARE
Not studied in earlier literature in this
context
(-) 0.05 (0.071) (Project Size and Client
Satisfaction – Kraut and Streeter 1995) non
offshore context SOFTWARE
Project
Management
(-) 0.20 (1.217***) (Horizontal coordination and
Residual project risk - Nidumolu 1995) non offshore
context SOFTWARE
0.35** (1.217***) (Extra-Project Communication and
Customer Uncertainty - Lievens and Moenaert 2000)
FINANCIAL SERVICES DESIGN
Not studied in earlier literature in this
context
0.32** (0.1461**) (Team size to formal
impersonal procedures - Kraut and Streeter
1995) non offshore SOFTWARE
Project
Performance
0.38** (0.903***) (Horizontal coordination and
Project Performance - Nidumolu 1995) non offshore
context SOFTWARE
0.510*** (0.344***) (Reporting Quality and Project
Performance - Thompson et al. 2007) non offshore
context SOFTWARE
-0.050 (0.576***) (Coordination success and software
quality - Kraut and Streeter 1995)
Not studied in earlier literature in this
context
(-) 0.052 (0.045) (Team size to project schedule slippage)
(Ethiraj et al. 2005) Offshore context SOFTWARE
Communication N/A Not studied in earlier literature in thiscontext
(-0.06) (0.364**) (Team size to coordination success)
(Ethiraj et al. 2005) Offshore context SOFTWARE
Team Stability N/A
Team Size N/A
Table 10a # Comparison of estimates from common model with similar work in software or services domain†
† * Significant at < 0.1, **Significant at < 0.05, ***Significant at < 0.001
†† Bold numbers in the parenthesis in each of the cells corresponds to the estimates obtained in our study
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Results of the Contrast Models 
We now compare the empirical findings across the data classifications. 
 
Maintenance and Development (M&D) Versus Testing Projects 
 While the model fits both M&D and testing project data well (see Table 7), there is a 
significant direct impact of project management on customer satisfaction (H3) in M&D 
projects, but not in testing projects. A possible explanation is based on the difference in task 
uncertainty – the level of unpredictability of the task the engineer is engaged in – across these 
two project types. Task uncertainty is higher in M&D projects because it involves 
understanding and fixing defects, and developing or enhancing software functionality 
(Brooks 1995; Pressman 2005). These tasks are typically not well structured and are subject 
to both evolving customer requirements and frequent customer involvement. Therefore, 
prioritization, work planning, and resource allocation need to be handled particularly well. 
Accordingly, for M&D projects, project management is of separate importance in itself, and 
directly impacts customer satisfaction. 
 On the other hand, task uncertainty is low in testing projects that involve verification 
testing and test automation services. Verification testing activities follow well-defined test 
routines specified by the customer and involve clear reporting requirements. Test automation 
work involves the development and execution of standard test scripts to automate the 
verification testing process. Because these tasks are highly structured and involve predictable 
time and resource requirements, ongoing prioritization, work planning, and resource 
allocation may not be so crucial. Further, the actual involvement of the customer with the 
team during the project is quite limited since most of the testing process occurs with little 
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customer interaction with a report provided at the end of testing. As a result one would 
expect that project management may not directly impact customer satisfaction in testing 
projects—instead, its effect is mediated by project performance.  
Second, we find that communication effectiveness has a significant direct impact on 
customer satisfaction in testing projects, but not in M&D projects. However, for both project 
types, communication effectiveness has a significant (p<.01) indirect impact on customer 
satisfaction (H6). Arguably, the regular reporting of progress and testing results to customers 
is of independent importance in testing projects because of the highly structured and time-
bound nature of the tasks involved.  
 Third, the direct effect of team stability on project management (H10) is significant 
(p<0.01) for M&D projects but not for testing projects. For M&D projects, learning is slow 
because the engineer has to gain familiarity with the code base and the software application 
domain to resolve defects and develop new features compatible with existing code (Banker 
and Slaughter 1997; Littman et al. 1987). In contrast, for testing projects, considerable work 
content is automated and the learning is faster. Further, once new engineers have had a 
limited initiation to the project, they can easily run predesigned testing scripts and interpret 
the results.  
45
Application Software vs. System Software Projects 
There is a significant direct effect of team stability on customer satisfaction (H8) in 
system software projects but not in application software projects. Our field research revealed 
that it was more difficult to find and replace engineers who were skilled in systems software, 
compared to application software. The relative scarcity and strong demand for talent in the 
system software domain has also documented by other researchers and practitioners (Bland 
2006; Clair and Linden 2005). Our finding is consistent with this perspective.  
The other major difference between these two classifications is that there is a direct, 
significant effect of team stability on project management (H10) in application software 
projects, but not in system software projects. Our discussions during the field studies and 
post-analysis interviews revealed that teams in system software projects were focused on 
comparatively small enhancements to large, complex pieces of code. In contrast, the teams 
engaged in application projects were involved in developing larger pieces of code. This 
called for greater coordination between engineers working on separate code components and 
across different phases of the development cycle. Further, teams working on application 
software projects assumed a large proportion of the total project responsibility and were 
typically responsible for the management of all development cycle activities. Consequently, 
these projects tended to last longer. Under these conditions, stable teams enabled superior 
long-term management of the projects.  
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High Age Vs Low Age Projects 
Team stability has a significant direct impact on customer satisfaction (Hypotheses 
H8) in older projects, but not in newer projects. Intuitively, in longer duration projects the 
offshore teams acquire greater knowledge about the product and have a successful history of 
managing the development process. Our field research revealed that in long duration projects 
the offshore engineers drew on this experience history to contribute more substantially to 
product enhancements, often exceeding the expectations of customers. Therefore, customers 
are particularly sensitive to the turnover of experienced hands in long duration projects 
because the loss of tacit knowledge in the development team and the corresponding 
productivity drop may be substantial. In addition, customers tend to build a personal rapport 
with engineers they have known for a while, and are averse to building new relationships 
with incoming employees.  
The sensitivity of customers to turnover in long duration projects may be exacerbated 
by the fact that most turnover does occur in such projects. Turnover in the Indian software 
industry is generally high – on average, only about 25% of hired engineers continue with a 
company for more than 5 years (Sudhakar 2002). An analysis of turnover from about 150 
projects within our dataset revealed that about 75% of the total turnover occurred in high age 
projects and involved engineers with an average experience of 1.5 years.  
We also find that team stability has a significant direct influence on project 
management (H10) in high age projects, but not in low age projects. In newer projects that 
are yet to stabilize, the teams go through a learning curve that enables them to understand the 
code and the interactions between various software components (Fjeldstad and Hamlen 1983; 
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Littman et al. 1987). Such an understanding, which comes with time, can help in planning, 
estimation and risk management activities (Rajlich 1999). Once such experience is built into 
the team over a period of time, team stability then plays an important role in securing that 
knowledge, so that it can be leveraged towards better managing the project.  
2.5. Conclusion  
Our findings have multiple implications for the management of outsourced offshore 
software projects. First, the study suggests that managing the offshore projects entail a life 
cycle effect where different capabilities are more important for different situations. For 
offshore managers, we find that team stability is an important component affecting project 
performance, project management, communication effectiveness and customer satisfaction. 
In general, managers must work hard to maintain the stability of the project teams. However, 
the overall duration of the offshore project moderates some of the influence of team stability. 
For new projects, team stability influences project performance, but does not directly 
influence customer satisfaction. In contrast, for older projects, team stability directly impacts 
customer satisfaction. Intuitively, when projects are new the customer is focused mainly on 
project delivery. However, as the team gains experience and project management capabilities 
over time, customers are loathe to lose valuable team members, and turnover directly affects 
customer satisfaction. While offshore managers must strive to maintain stable teams 
throughout, such stability is of even greater importance in established projects.  
This finding also has implications for a practice that several software services firms’ 
use called ‘shadowing.’ Shadow engineers work with project groups to learn the work, and 
prepare themselves to be inducted into the project. While the practice of shadowing can help 
stabilize the project by allowing a new engineer to begin taking over work from an existing 
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engineer who is anticipated to move out of the project and can help cut training lead times, it 
involves a short-term duplication of resources within the project team. In practice, shadow 
engineers are employed in new projects – often at project inception – as well as in long 
duration projects. Our results suggest that managers may best employ ‘shadow engineers’ not 
in the newer projects, but in projects that have been established (Greater than 2 years). This 
gestation period allows for knowledge structures within the project to be stabilized, and this 
knowledge can then be more readily transferred to the shadow engineers.  
Project management capabilities play an important role. They improve project 
performance and also impact customer satisfaction. Project management capabilities also 
mediate the impact of communication effectiveness on project performance. For managers of 
offshore software firms, this implies that a sole focus on hard technical capabilities related to 
software design and programming is insufficient; adequate attention must be paid to 
developing capabilities that enable effective planning and management of resources across 
time, and also managing communications with customers. The achievement of benchmark 
assessment ratings that are designed to build project management capabilities, including the 
well-known Capability Maturity Model from the Software Engineering Institute (SEI-CMM), 
can help in this context. The role of project management capabilities is more important when 
project-related uncertainty is high. Accordingly, managers must seek to build such 
capabilities particularly for M&D projects. Our results suggest that such capabilities are 
particularly effective in driving customer satisfaction in the uncertain environment associated 
with M&D projects (as opposed to testing projects).  
Communication effectiveness positively affects perceptions of project performance 
and project management. While communication effectiveness does not directly affect 
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customer satisfaction in most cases, its indirect effect through project performance and 
project management is significant. Our results suggest that managers must pay attention to 
multiple components of communication – including communication intensity and quality – 
towards delivering a satisfactory customer experience. Our interviews of managers at 
offshore software service providers suggested that some of these providers managed 
communications with customers better than others. In firms that performed strongly on this 
dimension, the offshore managers usually drew up a formal communication plan for new 
projects and these plans were reviewed periodically to reflect the needs of the prevailing 
project situation. These plans specified the reports that were to be exchanged, the lines of 
communication that were to be maintained, communication formats (email/oral 
communication), issue escalation hierarchies, the preferred initiators of communication for 
various tasks, preferred times for conference calls, and also the communication plan review 
periods.  
We find evidence of non-linear, inverted-U shaped effects of team size on 
communication effectiveness. This suggests that effective communication with customers 
can be an issue in both very small and very large projects – though for different reasons, as 
explained earlier. Correspondingly, managers must play special attention to implementing 
procedures that support the communication process in such projects.  
While we have discussed some of the key managerial implications of our findings 
from the perspective of the offshore managers, much of the discussion applies, with due 
adjustments, to customers in selecting outsourcing partners and managing outsourcing 
projects. For example, our findings suggest for tasks characterized by high uncertainty, the 
customer must try and choose a service provider with strong project management 
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capabilities. Likewise, the customer must set expectations of performance depending on the 
contextual variables associated with the project. For example, since learning takes time, we 
find that team stability is less crucial in the early stages of a project but is more important for 
projects that have been in the works for a while. Instead of being concerned about the lack of 
team stability during the very early stages of a new project, the customer may benefit from 
focusing on other commitments related to delivery specifications, quality, and timeliness.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. Individual Learning and Productivity in a Software Maintenance Environment: An 
Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Consistent with Adam Smith’s championship of the division of labor, firms have long 
viewed task specialization and experience on the job as a stepping stone to enhanced 
employee learning and productivity. To understand how such experience-based learning 
impacts productivity, researchers have studied multiple perspectives of the learning 
phenomenon, including the estimation of learning rates (e.g., Dutton and Thomas 1984) , the 
temporal patterns of learning (e.g., Lapré and Tsikriktsis 2006), and the accumulation and 
transferability of experience (Garg and Milliman 1961). Researchers have examined the 
relationship between experience and productivity across a range of work contexts – these 
include the airline (Asher 1956), apparel (Baloff 1971), semiconductor (Hatch and Mowery 
1998), manufacturing (Lapré and Van Wassenhove 2001), and service industries (Reagans et 
al. 2005). In general, there is strong evidence regarding the positive implications of 
specialization and experience for learning and productivity. 
At the same time, researchers and managers have become sensitive to the fact that 
greater specialization can sometimes hurt, rather than help. For example, firms that are highly 
specialized and inward looking can be overly focused on strengthening and exploiting 
existing competencies. These firms can suffer from “learning myopia” and may overlook the 
future (Levinthal and March 1993). Consequently, they can stumble into “competency traps” 
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where their own competencies ultimately limit their external, long-term vision. Organizations 
can steer clear of such traps and build new competencies by developing greater flexibility 
and absorptive capacity – the ability to store, retrieve, and transfer knowledge (Abernathy 
and Wayne 1974; Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
While these arguments have been explored mainly at an organizational (or macro) 
level, some interesting, parallel arguments exist at the micro level of individual employees 
and teams (Cohen 1991).7 Specifically, how does the pattern of past experience enhance 
individual learning and productivity? While Adam Smith championed the notion of 
specialization, is there something such as employee overspecialization? How do the 
specialization of experience (i.e., substantial work at a specific task) and the variety of 
experience (i.e., work that is dispersed across a variety of tasks) affect learning and 
productivity? How do specialization and variety of experience interact with each other in 
driving learning and productivity? This work contributes to the literature by examining these 
issues. 
The empirical investigation of these questions at the level of the individual employee 
has been limited (Argote et al. 2003). In the manufacturing context, several authors have 
found that cross training enhances productivity – see Hopp and Oyen (2004) for a review. 
Likewise, the implications of product variety for organizational performance have been 
extensively studied – see Ramdas (2003) for a review. However, relatively little is known 
about the overall impact of task variety on individual learning and productivity (Boudreau et 
al. 2003). The work of Schilling et al. (2003) constitutes a notable, recent exception. 
Schilling et al. designed an experimental setting where study participants were classified 
 
7 See Schilling et al. (2003) for a brief review of the literatures related to organizational, group, and individual 
learning.  
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under three conditions: specialization (playing multiple rounds of the strategic board game 
Go), related variation or variety (mixing up playing Go with playing the similar board game 
Reversi) and unrelated variation (mixing up playing Go with a computer version of the 
unrelated card game Cribbage). Their findings indicate that: (a) cumulative experience 
(number of Go games played) improved points scored on Go; (b) related experience with 
Reversi enhanced scores on Go; (c) related variation has a stronger effect on performance on 
Go than either specialization or unrelated variation; and (d) specialization and unrelated 
variation similarly affected performance on Go. 8
Our work builds on this and other work in the learning literature in the following 
ways. First, as noted by Schilling et al., real-life problems may be open ended and poorly 
defined, compared to an experiment that involves a well-defined strategic problem with 
immediate and accurate performance feedback. We use a panel data set that captures the 
performance of software engineers in a single firm on a range of debugging tasks to explore 
the validity of existing findings in the learning literature, and to deliver some new insights 
regarding learning and productivity.  
Second, we examine how specialization and variety of experience interact with each 
other in driving learning and productivity. This allows us to explore how specialization and 
variety of experience independently and interactively drive learning and productivity, and 
when there is “too much variety.” In this context, we adapt and apply the concept of 
 
8 Learning and productivity are two sides of the same coin. Learning results in increased storage of information 
in memory, and in the application of superior perceptive and cognitive processes that operate on that 
information. At this level, learning is invisible and immeasurable. However, to be meaningful, learning must 
ultimately manifest itself in superior task performance, whether that task involves taking a test or working on a 
machine. Consistent with the literature, we treat such superior task performance at an individual level as an 
evidence of learning (e.g., Huntley 2003; Schilling et al. 2003).  
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the economics literature towards understanding the trade-
off between specialization and exposure to variety.  
Third, there is a need to examine how contextual variables in real-life settings impact 
learning and productivity (Schilling et al. 2003). One of the key variables that impacts 
learning rates in practice is the stability of the project team. Argote (1999, p. 54) notes: 
“Although there has been a long tradition of research on predictors of turnover, only recently 
has research been devoted to determining the consequences of turnover.”  While previous 
studies have typically not found a strong effect of turnover on learning outcomes, this may be 
because the study context may play an important moderating role (Argote et al. 1990; Argote 
1999).  In this study, we investigate how both the entry of new team members and the exit of 
existing team members impact learning and productivity.  
Finally, much of the learning literature, and in particular the literature related to 
experience curve effects, has focused on manufacturing industries. The importance of the 
software services sector has steadily grown as firms and economies have become more 
knowledge-intensive, and as communication networks have grown in capacity and capability 
(Gopal et al. 2002). Apart from the theoretical contributions, our work yields a deeper 
substantial understanding of employee learning and productivity in the services sector.  
Data for the study was sourced from a large export-oriented software services 
provider based in India. The firm employs over 10,000 engineers and provides development 
and maintenance services in application and system software domains. Software-related 
exports comprised more than 90% of the firm’s revenue. The research effort was launched 
with on-site field work conducted over two months at the firm’s operating sites in India. The 
firm and its customers operated in a highly competitive environment, and were faced with 
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substantial challenges related to maintaining and supporting existing and newly introduced 
products. The firm’s operations reflected the standard elements of competitive and dynamic 
business environments, viz., shortening product cycle times, increasing feature introduction 
velocity, and rising product proliferation (Krishnan et al. 1998; Swaminathan and Lee 2003; 
Swaminathan and Tayur 2003). The firm’s customers progressively outsourced greater 
responsibilities to the firm in order to free up their own internal resources for more advanced 
projects – this is consistent with observations in other industry sectors (Nitsch and 
Swaminathan 2006). Whereas the firm was growing rapidly, it was also challenged to work 
efficiently with available resources in a tight market for skilled engineers.  
In this environment, top management valued rapid on-the-job learning by each 
engineer. Managers also believed that useful learning derived mostly from experience on the 
job, and not from in-class training. Further, given the rapid rate of product modification and 
introduction, maintenance teams were required to continuously work on newer tasks and 
technologies. Therefore, exposure to task variety was considered a key component of 
learning. In parallel, managers also recognized than intensive specialization would lead to 
motivational problems. Exposure to a greater variety of tasks on the job has been associated 
with lower fatigue, reduced absenteeism, and correspondingly, with increased productivity 
(Cappelli and Rogovsky 1994). Managers we interviewed noted that some engineers were 
dissatisfied after being on a project for as little as a year. Engineers also shied away from 
substantial specialization in order to build a portfolio of skills that would enhance their worth 
in the external market and stature within the firm (Loch et al. 2000). 
The firm also grappled with employee turnover, a key concern for the software 
industry worldwide (Amoribieta et al. 2001). The managers in the firm realized that effective 
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and quick learning was indispensable towards maintaining a steady inventory of capabilities 
in the face of such churn.  
The field research was accompanied by the collection of archival information, which 
was later compiled into a panel data set. These data captured details regarding the time of 
allocation of specific software defects to specific engineers across time, the time to resolution 
for the defects, defect characteristics, the software modules the defects occurred in, and 
engineer characteristics.    
 Our key findings are as follows. First, cumulative experience enhances learning and 
productivity. Second, there is an additional productivity gain for an individual that accrues 
from performing a greater variety of tasks. However, training individuals on such variety 
leads to a short term loss in productivity. This loss can be viewed an investment towards 
accruing long term productivity gains. Third, there is “too much variety” – we demonstrate 
that there is a tradeoff between exposure to a variety of modules and specializing on the 
modules that one is exposed to. Correspondingly, we find that variety plays an important role 
in increasing productivity only when the experience of the individual is highly specialized or 
concentrated.  Fourth, we find that more experienced individuals can handle new tasks faster 
than those with lesser experience, i.e., experience gained in the software maintenance context 
can be transferred and applied to the performance of new tasks. Fifth, individuals in larger 
teams are more productive than individuals in smaller teams. This suggests that informal 
collaborative environments where collocated individuals possess diverse but related skills 
can enhance learning. Finally, in the context of team turnover, individuals in smaller teams 
bear greater productivity loss due to employee joining compared to individuals in larger 
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teams. We also find that, surprisingly, entry of new employees joining may lead to a greater 
productivity loss than employee exit. 
The remainder of the work is structured as follows. The hypotheses are developed in 
§ 2. The data and measures are presented in § 3. The model and the estimation method is 
presented in § 4. Empirical findings are detailed in § 5 – some robustness checks are also 
described here. The research and managerial implications of our findings are described in § 
6.    
3.2. Hypotheses 
 We first discuss the hypotheses that relate individual experience to productivity, and 
then those that relate team changes (turnover) to productivity.  Our dependent variable is the 
average length of time taken by an engineer to debug software defects allocated to him or her 
at a certain point in time.  
 
Cumulative individual experience   
 There is a wide consensus among researchers and managers that more experience at a 
focused or specialized task yields higher productivity. This linkage, which was first 
prominently highlighted by Adam Smith (1776) was used to popularize the concept of 
division of labor, and today it is accepted almost as a truism. This linkage also underpins the 
concept of the experience curve, which posits that the marginal cost decreases while  
productivity increases with the cumulative level of output (Dutton and Thomas 1984). While 
many studies have established positive linkages between experience, learning, and 
productivity at an organizational level, scholars have noted that there are strong parallels 
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between such learning at the organizational and individual levels (Argote 1993; Larson and 
Christensen 1993; Schilling et al. 2003).  
 Productivity gains due to experience accrue because tasks become more routine over 
time, and individuals gain greater tacit knowledge about the task (Argote 1999). The 
resulting  learning curve at the individual level has been explained in terms of a three-fold 
transfer of learning: learning from past experience that is directly transferred to perform the 
task at hand at the same level as the last task completed, the application of learning from past 
tasks that is applied to make further adjustments in the way the current task is performed 
(thereby gaining some incremental productivity), and the application of the existing learning 
from previous tasks to improve the learning process from the current task (Ellis 1965).  
 In the context of software debugging, engineers gain both tacit and explicit 
knowledge with experience about the structure of the software code, linkages between 
different software modules, and the choice and sequence of debugging procedures to be 
followed in any specific context. They also learn to look for, and quickly identify important 
cues in the debugging process that reveal the nature and potential source of the bug.  This 
knowledge, which is built up over the cumulative amount of time they spend at debugging 
tasks, enables them to shorten debugging times. Building on these arguments: 
 H1: Higher individual experience is associated with shorter debugging times. 
 
Cumulative task variety  
 Individuals exposed to a variety of tasks can tackle problems within a single domain 
more efficiently and effectively. This positive effect of task variety can be manifested 
through multiple routes. First, exposure to task variety enables individuals gain knowledge 
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about the broader schema that is relevant to each of the diverse tasks (Graydon and Griffin 
1996; Paas and Van Merrenboer 1994). With this knowledge of the schema, the individual 
can better delineate knowledge that is relevant to the task at hand from knowledge that is less 
relevant. This prevents situations where the individual spends time and effort in mastering 
new knowledge that is not really useful to the current task.  
 Second, variety in tasks can also lead to implicit learning. While the individual may 
not even be aware of such learning, in the background, correlations between the task 
requirements in different domains are being stored in memory (Reber 1989; Simon 1991; 
Wulf and Schmidt 1997). This ultimately may lead to increased flexibility of the employee 
and contributes to better problem solving skills in any particular domain (Hopp and Oyen 
2004; Hopp et al. 2004). Implicit learning is often reflected in tacit rather than explicit 
knowledge. For example, a youngster who has watched numerous basketball games may 
ultimately play basketball well and by the rules, but can be tongue-tied when asked to 
enumerate the rules of basketball. Whether the effects of exposure to task variety operate 
through the development of a more complete schema of relevant knowledge or of implicit 
knowledge, it has been argued that in either case “learning is transferred between related 
problem domains through the development of a deeper cognitive structure that applies to 
both…” (Schilling et al. 2003, p. 45). Finally, apart from enhanced learning, increased job 
variety has been associated with lower boredom and higher employee motivation, greater 
cooperation, better communication and consequently, higher productivity (Batt and Osterman 
1993; Bishop and Kang 1996; Hopp and Oyen 2004). 
 These arguments are all applicable in the context of software debugging. First, 
because of the highly logical structure of software, working with a variety of software 
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modules exposes the engineer to the various patterns in which blocks of software code are 
written, the ways in which blocks of software code interact within a module, and the ways in 
which software modules (which typically contain multiple blocks of software code) relate to 
one another. When an engineer knows more about this general schema that guides the design 
of the software, the engineer can often make more knowledgeable inferences regarding the 
potential source of the bug with limited examination of a specific module that is being 
debugged. Second, when software engineers work across modules, they develop numerous 
implicit rules regarding the classification of bugs and potential sources of those bugs and 
underlying common remedies. This knowledge is largely implicit and undocumented. In 
practice, many software engineers develop a reputation for being particularly effective in 
detecting and resolving certain kinds of problems, and their expertise is often drawn upon by 
their colleagues. Finally, as revealed in our field study and acknowledged by practitioners, 
software engineers quickly succumb to boredom with repetitive tasks and actively seek out 
variety both to relieve that boredom and to build a wider portfolio of marketable skills (Reed 
2005). Building on these arguments:  
 H2: As the cumulative number of distinct software modules the engineer has worked 
with in the past increases, the average debugging time for allocated defects decreases.  
 
Influence of task newness  
 While diversity in experience can enhance learning in the long run, individuals need 
time and effort to adapt to unfamiliar tasks (Edmondson et al. 2001). In the context of 
software maintenance, debugging an unfamiliar module may be challenging. Engineers spend 
time and effort to understand the code structure and domain of each module, and its linkages 
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to related modules (Banker and Slaughter 1997; Littman et al. 1987; Rajlich 1999). 
Specifically in our study setting, classroom training played a minor role in preparing software 
engineers to tackle bugs in new modules. Instead, the engineers “self-trained” in one or both 
of the following ways. First, they worked through the code documentation and examined the 
code in detail to understand how the module worked and to what other modules it was linked. 
Second, they interacted with colleagues who had prior experience working on such modules. 
Accordingly, exposure to new variety can lead to serious short-term delays (Rus and Lindvall 
2002).  Building on these arguments: 
 H3: When engineers are allocated defects in software modules they are unfamiliar 
with, the debugging time for the allocated defects increases. 
 
The transfer of experience to new tasks  
Increase in experience improves skill levels of an individual, and results in enhanced 
productivity (Argote et al. 2003). Most tasks that individuals perform require learning more 
than one skill. For example, sending Morse code requires language, perceptual, and motor 
skills (Bryan and Harter 1899). While the time required to learn how to perform a task is 
proportional to the number of skills involved (Jovanovic and Griliches 1995), skills learnt 
can be used in other tasks that may be structured differently but call for the application of a 
subset of skills.  
Second, when individuals work on distinct but related tasks, there emerges a kind of 
an “aha!” effect that characterizes insightful problem solving (Schilling et al. 2003). This 
happens because, with experience, individuals better recognize patterns among tasks that 
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they encounter and develop deeper insights regarding those tasks compared to novices 
(Crossan et al. 1999; Fiol and Lyles 1985).  
These arguments are applicable within the software maintenance context. Software 
debugging calls for multiple skills related to perception, cognition, and motor activity. These 
skills may be relevant, for example, to programming new code, understanding prewritten 
code, using equipment to replicate bugs, and using debugging and code commit tools. In this 
scenario, many of the basic skills gained from experience can be transported to new tasks that 
are encountered at work. For example, skills in using tools such as debuggers can be applied 
across software modules. In addition, as engineers gain experience at debugging, they are 
better able to understand the code flow and technology domain of any given software 
module, and the linkage of that module with other parts of the software. This understanding 
can help them cope better with newly allocated modules. Building on these arguments: 
H4: The prior cumulative experience of the engineer moderates the effect of task 
newness on debugging time, in that engineers with greater cumulative experience require 
lesser time to debug unfamiliar modules compared to less experienced ones. 
 
The tradeoff between exposure to variety and specialization 
As argued earlier, exposure to task variety can enhance learning and productivity. 
However, too much variety may impede useful learning. In the manufacturing context, for 
example, a large variability in the options built into a car on the production line decreases 
productivity (Fisher and Ittner 1999).   
In the context of task-related learning, the need for a balance between the exposure to 
task variety and specialization (as in repeated exposure to a certain task) can be motivated as 
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follows.9 First, exposure to variety may help individuals draw linkages between bodies of 
knowledge stored in long term memory, enabling them to better perform any given task. 
However, to be stored in long term memory, information has to first be stored and processed 
through the buffer of short-term memory, which is of limited capacity (Newell and Simon 
1972). As noted by Simon (1990, p.2): “The number of chunks of information that can be 
held in short term memory is approximately seven.”  Further, repeated exposure to short term 
memory may be required for knowledge and skills associated with tasks to be correctly 
encoded into permanent memory.  Thus, when an individual’s exposure to variety is highly 
dispersed, there may not be a sufficient opportunity for the learning to be properly imbibed 
across tasks and then to be properly applied in a specific task.  
Second, exposure to overly high variety may not allow enough time to put what 
knowledge is learned into practice. For example, when using a statistical package, an 
individual can follow and implement some code from a technical manual to estimate a model 
fitted to the data. However, for that knowledge to be efficiently applied, possibly with some 
adjustments, to estimate a differently structured model using a different data set, the 
individual must be able to put that knowledge into practice a few times and be comfortable 
with designing and implementing the code. That is, practice at various tasks is an important 
antecedent of effective learning from variety in a technically sophisticated setting.  
Finally, as March (1991 p. 71) notes: “…maintaining an appropriate balance between 
exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and prosperity”. While 
March’s argument was made in the organizational context, its spirit also applies to individual 
 
9 An interesting parallel is that of preference learning of consumers. Hoeffler et al. (2006) suggest that 
the intensiveness and extensiveness of preference learning results in discovery of stable preferences. 
64
learning. Overexposure to variety can lead to a lot of shallow learning, but insufficient 
application of that learning towards enhancing productivity.  
 These arguments all apply in the context of software debugging. In this technically 
sophisticated knowledge domain, software engineers who work across distinct modules can 
develop numerous implicit rules regarding the potential sources of those bugs and defect 
resolution approaches. For such learning to be ingrained in long-term memory and 
effectively transferred across tasks, however, engineers must have sufficient practice to 
understand the code base of each module. Such learning can be derived from repeated 
assignment to software defects within the same module. Accordingly, engineers would not 
benefit from fleeting exposure to debugging a variety of modules, but may need a certain 
level of immersion within each module for an enduring learning experience that can be 
applied elsewhere.  
 In addition, task variety can enhance motivation at work. Our field study revealed that 
engineers who worked on a variety of tasks tended to be highly motivated to learn from those 
tasks and apply that learning. This is consistent with the notion that software developers are 
inherently variety seeking (Reed 2005). On the other hand, managers we interviewed also 
emphasized that an engineer who worked on too many components generally felt 
overworked. These engineers were also called on more often to help their colleagues because 
their exposure to variety was seen as a signal of higher individual competency. These effects 
may act to lower motivation levels and productivity. Therefore, maintaining a right balance 
between specialization and variety of experience will likely maximize productivity. Building 
on these arguments: 
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H5: A balance between the breadth of experience gained due to exposure to a variety 
of software modules and the depth of experience gained by performing an adequate number 
of tasks within each module results in lowest average debugging times. 
Team learning 
The collocation of individuals in a team can enable greater learning and productivity. 
For example, engineers in a ‘war room’ setting typically display superior timeliness and 
productivity (Teasley et al. 2002). Productivity is higher within collocated teams because 
team members can learn from each other better, and because they can better coordinate their 
individual activities towards the shared overall goal. While team learning generally exerts a 
positive influence on productivity, such learning can arise out of “emotional algorithms” that 
may be of a competitive or a cooperative nature (Loch et al. 2006). On the competitive side, 
individuals may seek status within the group by sharing expertise or they might highlight 
their helping behavior with an objective of attaining some economic rewards. On the 
cooperative side, helping behaviors may result from the need for reciprocation (i.e., the need 
to return favors in kind) or from the need to identify more strongly with the group as a social 
level.   
While positive implications of team-based learning and coordination have been 
established in domains as diverse as garment manufacturing and surgery (see Hamilton et al. 
2003 and Reagans et al. 2005, respectively), these effects are particularly relevant in 
knowledge-intensive domains such as software maintenance. Software debugging is an 
unstructured task that involves substantial informal communication between team members. 
Such communication often happens during informal meetings (Brown and Duguid 1991). 
Further, software debugging tasks are highly situational, i.e., there is no exact pattern of bug 
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resolution that works across all tasks. Such tasks are well-suited to collaborative learning 
(Tyre and von Hippel 1997).  
Our field research revealed that the software engineers frequently interacted with 
each other on an informal level to solve problems. Most of the engineers working on a 
project were collocated. In that setting, we commonly encountered instances where engineers 
walked over to their more experienced colleagues to discuss issues related to the potential 
sources of bugs or to obtain their insights regarding the software code flow. The engineers 
also collaborated by using more formal mechanisms, including pre-scheduled presentation, 
and the use of team mail aliases. Intuitively, one would expect that as the number of 
collocated members in a team increase, the likelihood that the knowledge required to resolve 
a bug is both available within the team and is quickly applied to resolve the bug increases. 
Building on these arguments: 
H6: As the size of the team an engineer works with increases, the average debugging 
time for the bugs allocated to that engineer decreases. 
 
Entry and exit of team members 
Churn in team membership can occur both on due to the exit of existing members and 
the entry of new members. The exit of a member results in the loss of collective 
organizational memory and can reduce productivity (Argote 1999; Johnson and Hasher 
1987). In addition, when employees exit a team, issues related to task reallocation and 
workload realignment must be resolved – these adjustments take time in themselves, and also 
impose new learning needs on the team members.  
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Team member exit can have a particularly strong impact on productivity in the 
software context because a large fraction of the knowledge possessed by software engineers 
is tacit in nature. Such knowledge is difficult to code, and cannot be replaced easily or at 
short notice. At the same time, in large teams, engineers with overlapping sets of knowledge 
can step into the role of the departing member, and multiple team members can pool their 
expertise and energy to address the gaps caused by the departure with limited loss to their 
own productivities. Therefore, the negative effects of team member exit are more likely to be 
experienced in smaller teams. As demonstrated by Narayanan et al. (2006) in the software 
development context, the stability of smaller teams had a direct impact on the quality and 
timeliness of delivery in offshore projects – such stability mattered less in larger teams. 
Building on these arguments: 
H7: As the ratio of the number of engineers exiting a team to the total number of team 
members increases in any time period, the average debugging time for the bugs assigned to 
an engineer in that team increases. 
 
While discussion on team turnover both in practice and the literature focus mainly on 
exit, the entry of new members can also reduce productivity.10 This is consistent with the 
well-known Brook’s Law: “Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later” 
(Brooks 1995, p. 25). New engineers not only need to learn about their tasks, but also about 
the communication patterns, cultural practices, and inter-individual relationships that guide 
 
10 See Carley (1992) for a simulation study of the impact of both team joining and exit. 
68
the working of the team. Existing team members may invest significant time and effort to 
facilitate such learning on the part of incoming team members (Mincer 1962).11 
In our study context, engineers joining a team frequently disrupted the work of 
existing members to seek their insights regarding both the organizational setup, and technical 
issues related to bug reproduction, bug fixing, verification of the fix, and finally committing 
the corrected code. While team members would cheerfully extend their cooperation in most 
cases, such effort would likely lower their own productivity. Further, this negative impact on 
productivity is likely to be higher for smaller teams where the burden of training a new 
individual cannot be shared across numerous team members. Building on these arguments: 
 H8: As the ratio of number of engineers joining a team to the total number of team 
members increases in any time period, the average debugging time for the bugs assigned to 
an engineer in that team increases. 
 
Control variables 
 We control for multiple variables that are of lesser theoretical interest but may also 
impact productivity in a software maintenance environment. First, we control for the work-
in-process, or the total number of assigned bugs to an engineer but unresolved at any given 
point in time. A high work-in-process can enhance productivity (because of the pressure to 
get the job done and move along) or detract from productivity (because it may reduce the 
engineer’s focus and concentration). Second, we control for bug severity. This is an urgency 
measure allocated by the supervising manager that reflects the degree to which the bug 
impairs overall software functionality (and hence needs urgent attention). Third, we control 
 
11 Apart from separately studying the impact of joining and exit, we also study the impact of ‘cumulative 
turnover’ (defined as the sum of new joining and employee exits) on productivity. 
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for total days of training the engineer received, including (a) technical training (focused on 
tool usage, programming skills, and domain knowledge), (b) process and quality training, and 
(c) communication and cultural training. Fourth, we control for whether the engineer seeks 
additional information from the person who filed the bug to assist the engineer in defect 
replication and resolution. Anecdotal evidence suggests that during debugging, significant 
time is taken to just replicate the bug in the software. This requirement of additional 
information is well-recognized in models of software debugging (Hale and Haworth 1991). 
Operationally, the bug is effectively in “sleep” mode while information is awaited – hence 
the importance of this control.   
Finally, the following variables, which could be candidates for additional control 
variables, are excluded from our model. First, we considered the “defect-reopening-rate” 
which measures the percentage of defects reported as resolved by an engineer during a time 
period that are re-reported as bugs at a later point in time. That is, an engineer trying to boost 
his or her reported bug-fixing productivity by delivering a number of hurried, but flawed bug 
fixes. However, we found that less than 1.5% of all reported bug fixes were ever re-opened. 
Second, the productivity of engineers could vary as a function of the set of available software 
analysis and debugging tools. However, all engineers we studied worked with the same set of 
tools. Finally, debugging rates in software projects may be related to the overall type of 
software a team is working on. In our dataset, the teams were involved in working on 
different modules of the same large piece of system software, used the same programming 
language, and applied broadly similar skill sets. 
 
70
3.3. Data, measures and model 
 Each engineer we study belonged to a team that was responsible for the corrective 
maintenance of one or more modules of a large system software configuration, where a 
module is defined as a piece of software code that has a distinct, well-defined functionality 
and is a part of larger body of software. Our dataset included details regarding the bug 
history, the engineer who performed the debugging, the date that task was assigned, bug 
severity, whether and when the engineer asked for additional information, the module in 
which the bug originated, and finally, the bug resolution date.  The resolution process of the 
bug is as follows: A bug’s designation is changed from “open” to “assigned” when it is 
assigned to an engineer. If all the information is not available, then the engineer seeks more 
information on debugging. If all information is available, an engineer works on the bug and 
at some date marks the bug as resolved along with resolution comments that indicate whether 
the bug is resolved12, a duplicate13, not reproducible14 (after a few rounds of trials), and 
closed15 (reasons are outlined for this state, which is reached only after significant effort has 
been expended and if all the parties agree that it is reasonable to do so). We also collected 
data from the human resources department on the training provided to the engineer, the date 
of joining the firm, the team the engineer belonged to, and the date the engineer moved out of 
the team.  
All the engineers working on a project were co-located, and interacted both in person 
and via email. The engineers possessed broadly the same set of skills (‘C’, Unix) but the 
 
12 The bug has been resolved and fixed 
 
13 The bug report describes the same problem as in another report 
 
14 Problem cannot be reproduced by the evaluating or the test engineer 
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software modules worked on could vary across projects. An engineer could be involved in 
debugging more than one module during any time period, and could over a period of time be 
assigned to debugging tasks in new modules that he/she had not worked on earlier. The 
manager in charge of the team was responsible for task assignment. Our final dataset 
consisted of 12503 valid bugs handled by 193 individuals from 31 teams.  
Measures 
Dependent variable ( itM ): Our dependent variable is the average time required by engineer 
‘i’ to resolve defects that are assigned in month ‘t’. This measure has been used earlier 
(Huntley 2003), and is consistent with the productivity measure used by the firm (Mean Time 
to Resolve bugs or “MTTR”  in a given month).    
 
Independent variables 
Individual Experience (Log(EXPit)): This is the natural log of the total number of days 
(EXP) since the engineer i joined the company as of the end of a given month ‘t’.
Variety or unique module allocation ( itI ): We assigned a categorical variable ( itI =1) for 
each module that the engineer had not worked on at any point in the past, but that was 
assigned to engineer ‘i’ during time t. 0=itI indicates that no new module was assigned to 
individual ‘i’ at time ‘t’.
Cumulative variety (Vit-1): The total number of unique modules allocated to an individual 
from time 0 through ‘t’, captured by 
=
=
t
s
isit IV
0
.
15 A bug report is valid, but a conscious decision has been made not to fix the bug. The rights to this are  
available to the component owner. 
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Team Size (TEAMSIZE): The total number of engineers in the team ‘z’ of engineer ‘i’ at time 
‘t’.  
New Joining and Exit (NEWJOINING/TEAMSIZE and EXIT/TEAMSIZE): New Joining 
(exit) is represented by the total number of engineers who joined (left) the team ‘z’ of
engineer ‘i’ during time period ‘t’. Over the time period we study, 119 engineers joined 
various teams and 48 engineers departed from their teams. In most cases of exit, a 
replacement was inducted into the team. In operational terms, we use the ratio of engineers 
joining or leaving the team to the total number of engineers in the team at time t (including 
those who left and joined during the period). 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Experience Index (HHEI): We encountered an interesting challenge 
when measuring the variety of experience. Specifically, the number of unique modules an 
engineer worked on is not, in itself, a good measure of variety from a learning perspective. 
For example, consider an engineer with a total experience of 15 bugs who was exposed to 5 
distinct modules and resolved 3 bugs on each module. In contrast, consider an engineer with 
the same total experience who has resolved 11 bugs on one module and one bug on each of 4 
other distinct modules. In line with the theoretical arguments presented earlier, the first 
engineer presumably has a superior exposure to variety from a learning perspective compared 
to the latter. We encountered many such instances of variation in exposure to variety across 
the engineers in our data.  
 To address this issue, we adapt and apply the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
which has been used to measure market concentration in economic and antitrust analyses. 
This index varies between 1/N and 1, where N is the total number of firms in the market. 
When market share is evenly dispersed across the N firms, HHI=1/N. In contrast, HHI=1 
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when one firm has all of the market and the other firms have infinitesimally small market 
shares – this essentially represents a monopoly.  
We use the following adaptation of the HHI – termed the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Experience Index (HHEI) henceforth – to measure the dispersion of an engineer’s exposure 
to distinct modules: 
Let iktC : Total bugs handled by engineer ‘i’ on module ‘k’ until time ‘t’
itD : Total number of bugs handled by engineer ‘i’ in time ‘t’ across all modules he or she 
has worked on until time ‘t’
it
ikt
ikt D
CP = : Cumulative proportion of bugs worked on in module ‘k’ by individual ‘i’ until 
time ‘t’.  
Then 

=
k
iktit PHHEI
2 is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Experience Index of engineer ‘i’ at time 
‘t’ based on all components ‘k’ that are worked on until time ‘t’.
Note that the HHEI for an engineer will change across time period to accommodate the 
changing allocation of tasks over time. A HHEI of 1 indicates that the engineer has worked 
on just one module, i.e., the experience is highly concentrated. In contrast, when HHEI is at 
its minimum possible value of 1/N, the engineer’s experience is equally dispersed across the 
modules he or she has worked on, with no single module responsible for a large fraction of 
the experience. Continuing with our example at the beginning of this section, the first 
engineer who has worked on 3 bugs in each of 5 modules will have a HHEI of 0.2 
(0.2^2+0.2^2+0.2^2+0.2^2+0.2^2 = 0.2), reflecting the dispersed nature of experience. 
However, the second engineer would have a HHEI of .556 that reflects the greater 
concentration of experience in one module.  
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Control Variables 
Work-in-process (Wit): This is the total number of defects that were left over unresolved in 
period ‘t’ that the individual would have to carry forward into the next period. This is given 
by itititit RAWW += 1 where Wi(t-1)  is the Work-in-progress in period ‘t-1’, Ait is the 
number of bugs assigned in period ‘t’ and Rit is the number of bugs resolved in period t. 
Severity (Sit): Severity ratings varied from 1 to 6. A Severity rating of 1 indicated that the bug 
did not impair functionality of the software. In contrast, a severity rating of 6 indicated that 
the bug impacted basic software functionality – hence early resolution was important. 
Training (Tit:): This is the total number of days the individual spent in various training 
programs. 
Fraction Information requirement (INFit): This is the fraction of all assigned defects during 
any time period ‘t’ that required additional information at some stage before the bug was 
ultimately resolved. 
 Summary statistics for the variables are in Table 11, and bivariate correlations are in 
Table 12. 
3.4. Model, Estimation, and Findings 
We test our hypotheses using the following specification, termed Model 1: 
 
………………………  MODEL 1 
++++=  )(Log*)(Log )1()1(3)1(2)1(1 titititiit EXPIIEXPM 
+++  )1(9)1(87 )/()/()( tiztiz TEAMSIZEEXITTEAMSIZENEWJOININGTEAMSIZE 
+++ 
2
)1(6)1(5)1(4 tititi HHEIHHEIV 
itittiitit WTSINF  ++++  13)1(121110 )(
Experience and 
Unique Module
Team Size and 
Turnover
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Variety and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Experience Index
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Variable Minimum Maximum GlobalAverage
Standard
Deviation
Individual Experience (days in Project) 79 2907 1093.3 754.14
Number of different Modules Handled 1 30 7.98 5.65
Team size to which an Individual Belongs 1 13 7.16 2.86
Total Number of Bugs Handled 2 440 64.7 70.34
HHEI Summary of Individual Averages 0.11 1 0.56 0.26
Summary of Work in Process means for each
Individual 0 8.33 3.08 2.71
Severity of Bugs 1 6 3.07 0.79
Panel Length for an individual 2 65 15.97 11.81
Average Time to resolve bugs in days 1 903 48.43 79.29
Average resignation/month across projects over
the time span of data collection for the project 0 2 1.06 0.574
Average Joining/month across projects over the
time span of data collection 1 2 1.19 0.275
Table 11 # Summary statistics for the panel data
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Table 12 # Bivariate correlations between the variables
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Average time to Resolve (a) 1
Individual experience (lag) (b) -0.064 1
Team Size (c) -0.127 -0.038 1
Variety Experience (Lag) (d) -0.129 0.318 0.03 1
Work in Progress (e) 0.273 0.088 -0.149 0.154 1
Average Severity (f) -0.128 0.096 -0.008 0.145 0.027 1
Fraction Requiring
Information (g) -0.027 0.071 0.085 0.066 -0.038 0.255 1
Ratio of Engineers Joined to
Team size (Lag) (h) 0.047 -0.026 0.027 -0.032 0.003 -0.014 -0.017 1
Ratio of Engineers Resigned
to Team size (Lag) (i) 0.009 0.017 0.002 0.037 0.01 -0.002 0 0.027 1
Allocation of Unique
Components (Lag) (j) 0.061 -0.224 -0.054 0.033 -0.007 -0.042 -0.018 0.02 0.016 1
HHEI (k) 0.132 -0.194 -0.116 -0.592 -0.034 -0.089 -0.067 0.013 -0.005 -0.158
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3.5. Estimation 
We estimated our model using a Fixed Effects regression for the following reasons. 
First, the R-square for a model with fixed effects for engineers was significantly higher than 
that for the pooled OLS (the results of the F-test for the significance of the fixed effects 
coefficients are in Table 12; p-value = .0001). Second, a Hausman test of the difference 
between the coefficients of the fixed and random effects models suggested the presence of 
possible endogeneity (Hausman 1978). A fixed effects specification accounts for endogeneity 
by accommodating the correlation between the independent variables and the error term.  
In panel data sets, errors across time periods for an individual may be correlated when the 
panel contains lengthy sequences of data for individuals (Petersen 2005). This leads to a 
downward bias in the estimates of the standard errors, resulting in higher t-values. This bias 
in standard error can be adjusted for by using cluster correlation to yield unbiased estimates 
of standard errors (Wooldridge 2002; Petersen 2005). Therefore, we corrected for possible 
auto-correlation using the clustering option in STATA (Rogers 1993).  
 
3.6. Findings 
Estimation results are in Table 13. First, cumulative experience reduces debugging 
time (supporting Hypotheses H1). Controlling for cumulative experience, we find that 
exposure to variety of experience (or cumulative task variety) is associated with lower 
debugging times (supporting Hypothesis H2). In the context of task newness, we find not 
only that debugging time increases as engineers encounter new modules (supporting 
Hypothesis H3), but also that this impact of newness is reduced when the engineers are more 
experienced (supporting Hypothesis H4). This suggests that experience in debugging existing 
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modules is transferred to debugging unfamiliar modules. Note that exposure to new modules 
is what leads to enhanced variety of experience, which, according to Hypothesis H2, leads to 
a decrease in debugging times. To reconcile Hypotheses H1 and H4, it is important to 
contrast the short-term and long-term effects of exposure to variety. The subtle but important 
distinction we find here is that, while cumulative exposure to variety over time improves 
productivity, exposure to variety involves some short-term productivity loss as engineers 
acclimatize to, and learn about, the new task. (also see Carillo and Gaimon 2000).  
Importantly, we find support for the argument that there is a tradeoff between 
experience gained due to exposure to a variety of software modules and the repeated 
allocation of bugs in a given module (specialization), and that the two need to be balanced to 
maximize learning and productivity.  After including both the cumulative experience and 
cumulative exposure to variety (i.e, the number of distinct modules worked on) in the model 
(see Table 13), we find that the linear coefficient of HHEI is significantly negative whereas 
the non-linear coefficient is significantly positive (supporting the non-linear Hypothesis H5). 
Intuitively, for very low values of HHEI, experience tends to be highly dispersed. In this 
case, focusing the engineers on fewer modules and increasing the specialization on each 
module (which increases HHEI), will lead to lower debugging times and increase 
productivity. In contrast, for high values of HHEI, the experience of the engineer is already 
highly concentrated on a few modules. In this case, adding variety to an individual’s 
experience will reduce HHEI, thereby reducing debugging times and increasing productivity. 
While the role of specialization in learning has been well-established, the role of variety has 
been addressed in fewer and more recent contexts (e.g., Schilling et al. 2003). Our work adds 
to existing insights in the area by highlighting some of the short-term negative effects of 
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exposure to variety and by empirically establishing the need for a balance between exposure 
to variety and specialization.  
Moving to issues of team size and churn, we find that larger team sizes are associated 
with shorter resolution times (supporting Hypothesis H6). In our study setting, there was a 
free flow of information between team members. There were no relative performance 
measurement systems implemented, and the organizational culture was one of cooperation 
and openness. Arguably, the larger inventory of skills and experience available within larger 
teams helped increase productivity. In terms of turnover, we find no evidence to support the 
notion that the debugging time increases as the ratio of engineers leaving a team to the total 
team size strength increases (i.e., Hypothesis H7 was not supported). We find, though, that 
debugging time increases when the ratio of engineers joining a team to the total team size 
strength increases (i.e., Hypothesis H8 is supported). We also estimated a model where we 
added new joining and exit to create a single variable that measured “team turnover”. This 
variable (Exit/ team size), when included in the regression in place of the new hire and exit 
ratio variables, also significantly impacted debugging times.  
These results add to existing perspectives on turnover and learning in the literature. 
First, some studies – for example, the study of the shipbuilding industry by Argote et al. 
(1990) – have found no evidence that turnover significantly impacted learning and 
productivity. However, this impact of turnover may be sensitive to the work context (Argote 
1999). In the context of software debugging, the considerable lead time involved in learning 
can impact productivity in case of turnover. Second, our analysis suggests that turnover may 
best be measured not in absolute terms but as a fraction of team size. This approach allows us 
to implicitly focus on the percentage of knowledge turned over. Finally, we note that our 
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finding that engineer exit does not significantly impact productivity may reflect the fact that 
the team usually has some time to prepare for exit once engineers give notice of their 
intentions to leave the team or the company. For example, other engineers may gradually 
ease into new tasks and roles in preparation for the exit. On the other hand, relatively little 
can be done, and little is usually done in the field, to prepare for the entry of a new team 
member. This is because the kind and level of attention the new entrant requires from 
existing members is largely unknown and can vary strongly across entrants.  
 Finally, for the control variables we find that, first, the severity of the bug is 
negatively associated, and work-in-process (WIP) is positively associated, with debugging 
time. Interestingly, the training provided to engineers did not have a significant impact on 
debugging time. We also estimated three additional models where the total number of days of 
training was replaced by the total number of days related to each of the three sub-types of 
training discussed earlier. None of the sub-types of training significantly impacted debugging 
time. Ex-post discussions with the firm’s managers revealed that the training offered was 
generic in nature and primarily aimed at familiarizing the engineers with the “language” of 
the workplace. Consistent with the observations of Rus and Lindvall (2002), the managers 
believed that most of the training that impacted productivity happened on the job.  
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Variables Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
 
P Value 
Log Individual Experience (t-1) -0.102 0.058 0.082 
Total Team size -0.044 0.021 0.039 
Cumulative Variety Experience (t-1) -0.032 0.013 0.017 
Work in Progress 0.097 0.008 0.000 
Average Severity -0.203 0.04 0.000 
Fraction Requiring Information 0.07 0.072 0.334 
Joined/Team size at (t-1) 0.36 0.165 0.030 
Turnover/Team size at (t-1) 0.409 0.293 0.165 
Unique module allocation (t-1) 0.323 0.149 0.032 
Interaction between unique module allocation 
and experience (t-1) -0.046 0.024 0.053 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Experience Index (t-1) -1.427 0.771 0.065 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Experience Index 
Square (t-1) 1.406 0.609 0.022 
Constant 4.682 0.391 0 
Adjusted R-Square 0.2691   
Mean Square Error 1.0162   
N 2794
F test for Engineer Fixed effects 2.287  0.0001 
Table 13 # Estimates calculated for Model 1 
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Robustness checks 
As a first step, we checked for the robustness of our findings by dropping selected 
variables to observe any changes in the coefficients of the remaining variables. Our estimates 
were stable to this manipulation. We first dropped the variables related to unique experience 
and the interaction of unique experience with cumulative experience. This did not vary the 
coefficients of HHEI and HHEI2 significantly, and other coefficients also remained 
unaffected. Similarly, dropping HHEI and HHEI2 did not impact other coefficients 
significantly. However, our analysis revealed that when HHEI2 alone was dropped, the sign 
of the linear coefficient of HHEI flipped from negative to positive but was not significantly 
different from zero (prob = 0.13). Figure 2 captures the underlying intuition. The non-linear 
effect in the figure is correctly picked up in Table 13 by the negative linear coefficient and 
the positive quadratic coefficient. However, when the quadratic coefficient is absent, the 
linear coefficient (slope of the dashed line in Figure 2) weakly picks up the increase in 
debugging time for high levels of HHEI (the right-hand side of Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 # Illustration of HHEI – Linear and Nonlinear effects 
 
0 1
Average 
time 
to Debug
HHEI
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Second, to better understand the impact of variety on productivity at different levels 
of HHEI and to further validate the nonlinear impact of HHEI, we categorized HHEI based 
on the median observation (HHEI =0.483), and estimated a related model (Model 2) 
described below:  
 
………………………  MODEL 2 
 
Here CATHHEI is a categorical variable with 0 (1) indicating Low (High) HHEI for the 
engineer in a time period. Specifically, engineers with a HHEI during a time period of greater 
(lesser) than 0.483 were coded 1 (0). Note that in this model CATHHEI is allowed to interact 
with cumulative variety Vit. The estimates of this model are presented in Table 13. These 
estimates are generally consistent with those in Table 3. More importantly, this model helps 
us validate the nonlinear effect of the interaction between HHEI and its interaction with 
variety. The estimates indicate that when HHEI is high (=1), i.e., the past experience is 
highly concentrated, an increase in cumulative variety reduces debugging time and improves 
productivity. When CATHHEI =1, note that the total coefficient for cumulative variety in 
Model 2 is ( 64  + ). The estimate for this coefficient was -0.078, which is significantly 
different from zero (p = 0.000, t = -4.93, 95% confidence interval of -109 to -.046). Further, 
when HHEI is set to zero, the coefficient of variety (now 4 ) is not significantly different 
++++=  )(Log*)(Log )1()1(3)1(2)1(1 titititiit EXPIIEXPM 
+++  )1(9)1(87 )/()/()( tiztiz TEAMSIZEEXITTEAMSIZENEWJOININGTEAMSIZE 
+++  )1(6)1(5)1(4 )*( tititi VCATHHEICATHHEIV 
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Experience and 
Unique Module
Team Size and 
Turnover
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Variety and 
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from zero. This suggests that increasing variety may help increase productivity when the 
experience of an individual is highly concentrated, but not when the experience of the 
individual is already highly dispersed. This argument is consistent with, and increases our 
confidence in the insights obtained from the estimation of Model 1.  
Variable Estimates Robust Std. error P-Value 
Log Individual Experience (t-1) -0.11 0.055 0.048 
Work in Progress 0.098 0.008 0.000 
Average Severity -0.205 0.04 0.000 
Fraction Requiring Information 0.072 0.073 0.325 
Total Team size -0.042 0.020 0.043 
Cumulative Variety Experience (t-1) -0.019 0.013 0.163 
Unique module allocation (t-1) 0.287 0.141 0.043 
Interaction between unique module allocation and 
experience (t-1) -0.04 0.022 0.076 
Joined/Team size at (t-1) 0.351 0.163 0.032 
Turnover/Team size at (t-1) 0.475 0.271 0.081 
Interaction of Categorical HHEI and Cumulative 
variety experience (t-1) -0.059 0.015 0.000 
HHEI Categorical (1 is High and 0 is low)  (t-1) 0.36 0.131 0.007 
Constant 3.745 0.349 0.000 
Adjusted R-Square 0.267   
Mean Square Error 1.017   
N 2794
F test for Engineer Fixed effects 2.295  0.000 
Table 14 #  Estimates for Model 2 
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3.7. Conclusion 
 Our findings have implications for both managers and researchers. 
Managerial Implications 
First, from the perspective of learning patterns, our findings suggest that managers 
must strive for the correct balance between specialization and exposure to variety in training. 
In fact, in our study, the effects of initial training were not significant in enhancing 
productivity (although some of that training may be necessary to “break-in” the engineers 
and get them started on the job). Much if the learning happens on the job. Therefore, 
managers must carefully consider the stage in which correct balance between specialization 
and exposure to variety is achieved, and its variation across individuals.  
Second, managers must be sensitive to the notion that there may be “too much 
variety.” In this context, our empirical findings reveal that learning and productivity drop 
when experience is overly scattered across different modules. In addition, our field research 
indicated that engineers who handled an excessively large variety of modules felt that they 
were penalized more for being productive. 
Third, our findings indicate that exposure to variety reduces productivity in the short 
term. Therefore, managers must both schedule an engineer’s exposure to variety when peak 
productivity is not required and must be prepared to wait awhile before the gains from 
variety-driven learning are realized.  
Fourth, managers must carefully consider how tasks must be allocated across the 
members in a team so that the overall productivity of the team is maximized. This decision 
has both spatial (task allocation across team members at a point in time) and temporal 
(change in the allocation of tasks over time) dimensions. For example, in the short term, our 
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findings indicate that the most experienced member of the team will be the most productive 
at a new task. However, for long term productivity, it may be optimal to allocate that task to 
a less experienced team member who is in a position to learn the most from such exposure. 
This member may struggle with the task, but the ultimate gain in long term productivity will 
likely be the highest in his or her case.  A possible allocation heuristic could involve 
exposing new members to a few modules to increase exposure to variety and to enhance 
rapid learning, and then introduce occasional variety possibly to enhance their intuitions on 
existing tasks as they gain in experience.  
 Finally, managers may need to shift from thinking about team turnover as a single 
concept, and focus on the separate effects of entry and exit of individuals into and from the 
team. While managers are generally concerned about exit, our findings suggest that entry 
may be more of a problem at least in the context of short term productivity. In most firms, an 
employee is required to provide notice sufficiently in advance of exit – this allows the work 
transition to be carefully planned so that productivity is maintained. However, the entry of a 
new employee is more difficult to plan for because the kind and depth of resources he or she 
will draw from the remaining team members to get up to speed are difficult to predict.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
Whereas the benefits of specialization have been expounded since Adam Smith, the 
role of task variety in enhancing learning has been recognized, or at least, sufficiently 
highlighted, only in relatively recent times (e.g., Schilling et al. 2003). Our work adds to 
existing perspectives on task specialization and variety by theoretically motivating and 
empirically establishing the idea of learning by doing in a real-life, knowledge-intensive, 
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while collar environment. In particular we find that the best learning occurs when there is a 
certain balance between specialization and variety.  
Second, while our analysis was mainly focused on individual learning, the results 
have implications for group/team learning as well. This is consistent with the notion that, 
depending on the context, the concepts of individual, group, and organizational learning may 
be highly interconnected (Argote 1993, Larson and Christensen 1993). In the firm we study, 
learning occurs not just from exposure to variety and specializing in tasks but also from the 
sharing of knowledge between team members. Therefore, if the individual is trained well, 
there are potentially some ripple effects on learning and productivity at the group level as 
well (Siemsen at al. 2006). Additionally, the firm usually benefits from overall team-level 
productivity more than it benefits from the productivity of an individual within the team.  
Third, in the methodological context, our conceptualization of the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Experience Index (HHEI) can be applies to measure the dispersion of experience 
in future empirical studies of learning and associated phenomena. 
Finally, our findings on the team size, new joining and employee exit suggest that 
additions to and attritions from teams have distinct impacts on learning and productivity. 
Hence research must ideally consider and evaluate these concepts separately. In addition, we 
find that the absolute number of new or departing team members is less significant than the 
fraction of members joining anew or departing from the team. This is because the variables 
of greatest operational relevance to overall team productivity are the percentage of 
knowledge turned over (when team members depart) and the fractional additional load 
imposed on an existing team member (in case incoming team members need to be brought up 
to speed).  
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CHAPTER 4 
4. Optimal Resource Allocation in Software Maintenance 
4.1. Introduction 
A recent report by NIST (2002) estimates that the annual cost of software bugs16 to 
the economy is a staggering $59.5 billion. The key reasons cited are (1) lack of testing 
infrastructure; (2) inefficiency of testing process in capturing bugs and (3) progressively 
increasing complexity of software. It is acknowledged in the software maintenance literature 
that perfect software with zero bugs is unrealistic due to continually evolving nature of the 
product (Liberman 1997). Further, software maintenance is costly – maintenance budgets 
constitute between 50% and 80% of the overall IS budget (Nosek and Palvia 1990), and costs 
of maintenance are known to outweigh the costs of development by a factor between 2 and 
10 (Scacchi 1994). A considerable amount of the expense is expended on labor – close to 
75% (Amoribieta et al. 2001). Because the current business environment is characterized by 
scarce labor resources and high employee turnover– only 25% of hired engineers continue 
with a company for more than 5 years (Sudhakar 2002), managers handling maintenance 
activities are challenged to utilize available resources effectively.  
Increase in utilization of engineering resources can be accomplished in two ways. 
First, the productivity of engineers can be increased by increasing the rate of learning of 
 
16 Problem due to which the software does not meet the intended specifications 
89
employees. This can be done by allocating tasks to individuals based on the amount of 
variety in their current assignments and the concentration of experience (Narayanan et al. 
2006), collocating team members (Teasley et al. 2002; Narayanan et al. 2006) and effectively 
managing the process of employee entry and employee exit (Narayanan et al. 2006). Second, 
adjustments can be made to the process of debugging based on the properties of the 
debugging task – focus of the current work.  
Software maintenance is divided into perfective, adaptive, corrective and preventive 
maintenance (Leintz et al. 1978). Corrective maintenance involves fixing bugs in the 
software. Perfective, adaptive and preventive maintenance tasks may involve addition of new 
features to improve functionality of the software or modifying the software specifications to 
meet future needs. A considerable amount of current academic work in software maintenance 
– from a management science perspective – is oriented towards understanding software 
enhancement (e.g. Banker and Slaughter 1997; Banker et al. 1998; Krishnan et al. 2004).  At 
the bug level, considerable work has been done on predicting occurrence rates of bugs (e.g. 
Elrich and Emerson 1987; Goel and Okumoto 1979; Littlewood 1980; van Pul 1994). ). 
Despite considerable amount of research on software maintenance, investigation on 
debugging process has been scarce to the extent that it has been labeled as a “scandal” by 
Liberman (1997). Current research in software debugging has focused on understanding 
cognitive behavior of engineers undertaking the debugging task (Hale and Haworth 1991; 
Hale et al. 1999). However, there is little or no work to the best of our knowledge that offers 
a management science perspective to the debugging process. Further, management of 
debugging efforts – queue management – is different from the management of enhancement 
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activities in software – project management (April et al. 2004). Our work differs from the 
prior literature in software maintenance in the following aspects.  
First, we focus on individual software debugging tasks unlike enhancement projects 
as in the past literature (Banker et al. 2002; 1991;1998; Banker and Slaughter 1997; Kemerer 
and Slaughter 1997; Krishnan et al. 2004). Next, our focus is on the resources – labor 
resources – and utilization of those resources to extract maximum efficiency and not the 
software per se. Finally, we focus on capacity planning and enumerate the varied tradeoffs 
that managers face between the choice of capacity, queue length and management of the 
diversity of incoming tasks when resource endowments are limited.  
Our decision model involves two stages. In the first stage, we draw from theory and 
propose alternative econometric models of bug resolution. These models are then estimated 
and validated using bug resolution data from a large software software company.  Based on 
this analysis, we draw the insight that the fraction of bugs successfully resolved in each 
period decreases, as the bugs stay in the system longer. The best fitting model – which 
specifies a beta geometric distribution of the conditional probability of bug resolution during 
a given time period – is taken forward to the second stage.  
In the second stage, we develop a heuristic estimate of the effort required to resolve 
the incoming bugs under various output requirements. We present an optimization algorithm 
that imposes cut-off policies based on the time that bugs should be worked on without 
finding successful resolution. We demonstrate that such policies minimally impact rates of 
successful bug resolution, while simultaneously reducing waiting times for the assignment of 
incoming bugs to engineers and improving the overall productivity of the maintenance 
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operation. We extend our analysis to consider resource allocation decisions when the 
resource allocation priority can vary across the categories of incoming bugs. 
In § 2, we describe the research setting and the dataset used. In § 3, we examine 
competing model specifications and choose the model that provides the best prediction of the 
resolution phenomenon observed in our data. In § 4, we examine model validity and 
understand the implications of imposing a policy of threshold time period to cut off working 
on bugs. In § 5, we extend our analysis of the threshold policies to multiple groups. In § 6, 
we use queueing approximations from the literature to analyze the tradeoff between 
imposition of threshold policies and the waiting time of bugs in the system for two different 
queueing systems – First Come First Serve (FCFS) and Pre-Emptive Resume priority. 
Finally, in § 7, we outline limitations of the model, discuss the managerial implications and 
possible generalizations.   
 
4.2. Research setting and data 
Research Setting 
The data for the study was sourced from a large India-based, export-oriented software 
services provider. The firm employs over 10,000 engineers and develops and maintains both 
application and system software. Exports comprise more than 90% of the firm’s revenue. The 
research effort included on-site field work conducted over two months at the firm’s operating 
sites in India. The data covers 12503 debugging tasks performed on bugs originating from a 
large piece of system software. These tasks were assigned to engineers in project teams. The 
teams were supervised by lead engineers. 
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Resolution Process 
Each incoming bug is assigned to an engineer who works on the bug individually. 
Engineers also seek opinion of their counterparts or solicit help from email listserve’s and 
product documentation. Figure 3 shows the process of bug resolution. The resolution process 
is as follows: (1) the engineer investigates whether the bug is valid. If the bug is not valid 
bug then it can be designated as junk17. If the bug is valid, then the engineer tries to 
reproduce the bug in a laboratory setting. (2) If the bug is reproduced, then an attempt is 
made to resolve the bug. If not, the attempts to reproduce the bugs continue. If attempts to 
reproduce are repeated unsuccessfully, bugs can be designated as irreproducible18 (3) If the 
bug is successfully reproduced, an engineer attempts to resolve the bug. Such attempts can 
result in the bug being successfully resolved (Either resolved19 or duplicate20) or not being 
successfully resolved resulting in a closure21. We group irreproducible and closed bugs and 
classify them as unsuccessful resolutions. These are resolutions because effort is invested in 
resolving such bugs leading to an end state. They are unsuccessful because they do not 
directly contribute to improvement in the overall quality of the product. The other bugs are 
 
17 The bug does not require any changes to the software  
 
18 Problem cannot be reproduced by the evaluating or the test engineer. Typical reasons for a bug to be declared 
irreproducible bug is “compatibility problems with different software.” 
 
19 The bug has been resolved and fixed 
 
20 The bug report describes the same problem contained in another report 
 
21 The bug report is valid, but a conscious decision has been made not to fix the bug. The rights to this are 
available to the component owner. Typical reasons for closure of a bug are (a) a one off case that is not 
expected to repeat because the customer used the software in conditions that were not in conformance to 
specification (b) technical changes needed to fix the bug could potentially create problems in other features of 
the software. 
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designated as successful resolutions. They are successful because the bug has either been 
fixed or is tracked and tagged to a known problem.  
Our field interviews with the managers suggested that the engineers tend to work on 
problems in an iterative manner. On occasions, when a clear solution is not available, the 
engineer rests on the problem before making another attempt on the problem. This is in line 
with other investigations of engineer behavior during the debugging process (Hale and 
Haworth 1991). In any resolution iteration, the engineer generates a hypothesis on the cause 
of the bug, and implements a resolution tactic based on the current hypothesis. If the 
hypothesis is correct, the cause of the bug is found and the bug is resolved. If the hypothesis 
is incorrect, a different hypothesis is generated and another attempt is made at the resolution 
(Hale and Haworth 1991). 
Table 15 presents the resolution data with the time span of resolution divided into 
months – henceforth called a period. As seen in Table 15, in each period, some bugs are 
successfully resolved, some are designated as closed or irreproducible and the remaining 
bugs are carried forward into the next period since no conclusion can be reached on their 
status. As seen in Table 15 (Figure 4), the proportion of successful resolutions decreases with 
time. The intuition behind this decrease can be explained based on the Hale and Haworth 
(1991) model of debugging mentioned above. With each unsuccessful hypothesis generation 
exercise, the engineer takes longer to generate the next hypotheses given limitations of 
current know how. Also, the number of alternative hypothesis may also drop after each 
unsuccessful hypothesis because an even greater level of investigation may be called for.  
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Figure 3 # Bug resolution process 
 
Further, if the drop in the ratios of successfully resolved bugs with increasing time 
period as shown in Table 15 is significant, then with time, the population of bugs (tasks) in 
an engineer’s portfolio will have a high proportion of bugs with low resolution probability. 
The effort invested in clearing low resolution probability bugs may come at the expense of 
effort that could potentially be invested in resolving incoming bugs that have a greater 
probability of being resolved. Under situations of high capacity utilization, theory predicts 
longer waiting and resolution times. In line with this, Table 16 shows that the average 
number of days between the submission of a bug and its assignment increases considerably 
from 15.22 days for severity 1 bugs to 117.43 for severity 6 bugs. The lag between 
submission and assignment lends credence to the idea that waiting times exist in such 
systems, and are higher in particular for the low severity bugs. To avoid longer waiting and 
resolution times, we can consider implementing a cut off policy based on threshold time that 
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a bug spends in the system without successful resolution. Next, we model the ratios of 
successful resolutions over time shown in Table 15, to test whether the drop is significant 
using competing model specifications. 
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Figure 4 # Proportion of Successfully Resolved bugs in any time period 
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Time 
period 
(Months) 
Successful 
Resolutions Total 
Closed/ 
Irreproducible
Carried 
Forward 
Ratio 
Resolved 
1 7147 12503 1774 5356 0.572 
2 1067 3582 431 2515 0.298 
3 428 2084 215 1656 0.205 
4 260 1441 103 1181 0.18 
5 189 1078 51 889 0.175 
6 136 838 40 702 0.162 
7 96 662 42 566 0.145 
8 74 524 26 450 0.141 
9 52 424 15 372 0.123 
10 32 357 14 325 0.09 
11 34 311 27 277 0.109 
12 22 250 13 228 0.088 
13 23 215 5 192 0.107 
14 17 187 8 170 0.091 
15 11 162 12 151 0.068 
16 15 139 7 124 0.108 
17 18 117 7 99 0.154 
18 4 92 6 88 0.043 
19 10 82 9 72 0.122 
20 7 63 3 56 0.111 
21 3 53 2 50 0.057 
22 6 48 4 42 0.125 
23 5 38 3 33 0.132 
24 3 30 5 27 0.100 
25 3 22 3 19 0.136 
26 1 16 3 15 0.063 
27 2 12 0 10 0.167 
28 2 10 0 8 0.200 
29 1 8 0 7 0.125 
30 1 7 1 6 0.143 
31 2 5 1 3 0.400 
32 1 2 1 0 0.500 
Total 9672 25362  0.381
Table 15 #  Successful resolutions in each time period 
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Severity Windsorized 
Mean 
Median Mean  
1 8.5 2 15.22
2 12.8 3 27.85
3 20.12 3 44.39
4 46.86 7 82.16
5 59.61 9 115.20
6 62.54 3 117.43
Table 16 # Average waiting time (in days) before bug is assigned to engineers 
 
4.3. Alternative model formulations and results 
Table 15 summarizes the data for an overall 25362 bug-months that 12503 bugs spent 
in the system. To model the probability of successful resolution in each time period, a 
straightforward – naïve approach – would be to consider each entering bug having a 
homogeneous probability of resolution p in any time period22. In this case, the probability of 
resolution of a bug at any time t given unsuccessful resolution until t-1 is distributed 
geometric. The maximum likelihood estimate of p for this model evaluated using data given 
in Table 15 is 0.381 (0.003)23. This number is consistent with the maximum likelihood 
estimate of the resolution probability provided by Table 15 (9672/25362=0.381). A plot of 
the expected and the actual number of resolutions is shown in Figure 5. The estimates of the 
log likelihood and the chi-square are shown in Table 17. The plot between the expected and 
actual value and the chi-square statistic do not suggest a good fit for the model.  
 
22 We assume that there is at least one attempt made each month the bug is in the system 
 
23 Number in parenthesis is standard error 
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Figure 5 # Actual vs. Expected numbers for the naïve model 
 
Further, the reduction in the ratio of bugs resolved over time suggests heterogeneity 
in the population of bugs, i.e. the conditional probability that a bug is resolved in time t given 
that it has not been resolved until t-1, is a decreasing function of time. This heterogeneity has 
also been observed in other contexts such as fertility studies (Kaplan et al. 1992; Weinberg 
and Gladen 1986; Suchindran et al. 1974). Further, the significant reduction in probability of 
conception success with increasing trials has operational implications for managing the flow 
of entities in service system such as IVF-ET centers in hospitals as shown in Kaplan et al. 
(1992). We draw from this stream of literature and model the presence of heterogeneity in the 
incoming bugs using competing model specifications and assess comparative fit of the 
models using multiple criterions (graphical comparison, Pearson chi-square and log 
likelihood values – AIC Criterion).   
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Beta-geometric model 
A generalized expression for the probability of resolution in period t can be written 
as: 
	 =
1
0
1' )()1( dppfppp ttt (1) 
where, f(p) is the probability density function of p. Assuming that p is drawn from a beta 
distribution with parameters  and  , (Suchindran et al. 1974) we can show that the 
conditional probability of successfully resolving a bug in period t given that it has not been 
successfully resolved until period t-1 is: 
1++
=
t
pt 

(2) 
In equation 2, pt is monotonically decreasing with time, and 0
tp as t` . The parameter 
estimates of  and  and the standard errors of estimates for the parameters for this model 
are presented in Table 17 (Beta-Geometric hazard case). Figure 6 shows the relative fit of the 
actual and the expected values. 
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Figure 6 # Actual vs. Expected success with p distributed beta-geometric 
 
Split population geometric model 
Next we consider a split population geometric model (Kaplan et al. 1992). This model 
assumes that there is a fraction  of the population of incoming bugs cannot be resolved. 
The probability of successful resolution in time t (pt), follows geometric distribution given by 
1)1( = ttt ppp . The conditional probability of successfully resolving the bug in time t
given that the bug has not been resolved until t-1 is given by 
1
1
)1(1
)1(


+

= t
t
t p
ppp


(3) 
Similar to equation 2, equation 3 also has the property that 0
tp as 
t . The plot 
showing the fit between predicted and actual values of the proportion of bugs resolved in 
each period is shown in Figure 7. The parameter estimates of p and , the standard errors, 
and the fit measures for this model are shown in Table 17.   
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Figure 7 # Expected vs. Actual for the Split Population Geometric Model 
 
Trinomial model 
The split population model and the beta-geometric model do not explicitly 
parameterize the bugs that are declared unsuccessfully resolved in each time period. A 
variant of the split population model can be created to explicitly account for this set of bugs. 
In this model, in each period, there are three groups. The first group of bugs is that which is 
successfully resolved, the second group of bugs is that which is declared as unsuccessfully 
resolved and the third group of bugs are those on which no decision is reached and these 
bugs are carried forward into the next period. We assume that the probability of resolution p 
in time t is given by the beta-geometric hazard – equation 2 – and the fraction of bugs that 
are unsuccessfully resolved in each time period by  . We estimate three parameters – 
namely  ,  , and  – to completely characterize the distribution of successfully resolved 
bugs in each period in this case. The likelihood function is shown in the appendix (equation 
34). The model fit statistics and the parameter estimates with respective standard errors are 
shown in Table 17.  The relative fit of the actual and expected values is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 # Expected  vs. Actual for the Trinomial Model 
 
To compare the maximum likelihood models, we can use the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) – )2( kLL + – where k is the number of parameters in the model, and LL is 
the Log-Likelihood as a measure. However as a single measure, AIC is not interpretable as a 
measure of model fit (Burnham and Anderson 2004). Based on this criterion, we choose the 
model with the lowest value of AIC – See Table 17, the valued of AIC for beta-geometric 
model are the least. The beta-geometric hazard model also has the lowest Chi-Square number 
– implying that the deviation between the actual and the expected values is least amongst the 
competing models. A simple but powerful evidence of the relative model fit can be to 
compare the plots of the predicted and actual numbers of successfully resolved bugs for the 
naïve, split population geometric, beta-geometric hazard and the trinomial models (Figure 5 
through Figure 8). A comparison of the plot reveals that the beta-geometric distribution 
performs well. Further, for all the models the p-value of the likelihood ratio chi-square test 
for are significant (P < 0.001) – suggesting that the test rejects the null hypotheses that the 
specified model predicts the data well. However, this should not come as a surprise given 
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that chi-square test is known to be sensitive to sample sizes24(Segars and Grover 1993). To 
overcome this problem, literature suggests the use of Normed Chi-Square as a measure of 
model fit Segars and Grover (1993). In majority of the cases we find that the normed chi-
square measure is less than the suggested metric of three. Finally, one may expect the three 
parameter model to outperform the two parameter model, however in our case, this 
expectation may not hold true because the beta-geometric and the trinomial models are non-
nested. Based on the above rationale, we choose beta-geometric model for our analysis.  
One of the implications of selecting the beta-geometric model is that, as 
t ,
0
tp . As stated earlier, when the teams are working at near 100% utilization, both the 
waiting and service times in the system will increase exponentially. In further sections, we 
consider the implications of imposing cut off policies on the resolution probability and the 
waiting times in the system. 
 
Model 
Chi-Square LL Parameter Estimates 
Std. 
Error 
Naïve  2517.17 -16858.75 p 0.381 0.003 
 1.025 0.024 Beta Geometric 
Hazard 223.96 -14777.4  0.543 0.023 
 0.963 0.003 Split Population 
Geometric 4,976,653 -16308.15 p 0.436 0.002 
 0.904 0.026 
 0.426 0.018 
Trinomial  258.38 -21658.1  0.11 0.001 
Table 17 # Estimates and Model fit of comparative models 
 
24 We ran the beta-geometric model with sub-groups of data drawn from individual teams. The beta-geometric 
specification performed very well and the chi-square test supports the null hypothesis that the model describes 
the data (For example in Table 18, the data for Deployment-related category accepts that null hypothesis that 
the underlying distribution is beta geometric – p value is 0.621). Finally as suggested by Segars and Grover 
(1993) – Normed Chi-Square -- our values of Chi-square/DF for most model other than the common model 
exhibited the property of Chi-square/DF being less than 3 for most models with reasonable sample sizes. 
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4.4. Impact of cut off policies 
In this section, we explore the implications of imposing a threshold time period to cut 
off working on a bug (denoted by a) and move it to an unsuccessfully resolved state. In part 
the methodology follows Kaplan et al. (1992). We estimate implications of this policy for the 
common model25 that does not differentiate the incoming bugs in any manner. Later, in § 5, 
we also extend the analysis to a setting where bugs are differentiated based on the group that 
filed the bug. 
Let U – a random variable – be the time period when a bug exits the system as 
unsuccessfully resolved. Let S – a random variable – is the time period when a bug exits the 
system as successfully resolved. Finally, let X be the random variable indicating the actual 
number of periods taken to resolve the bug. Then assuming U and S are independent: 
X = Min {U, S} and,  
 }Pr{}Pr{}Pr{ xSxUxX = x = 1,2,3,….                                    (4) 
The number of time periods a bug is expected to last is given by  


=
=
1
}Pr{
x
xXe (5) 
When bugs are moved to an unsuccessfully resolved state after a threshold of a time periods, 
the probabilities 0})(Pr{ => aaU and 0})(Pr{ => aaS , can be written as a function of the 
cut off time period a. If a bug enters period a, it implies that it did not reach either resolved 
or unresolved states until period a-1. The probability that a randomly chosen bug gets 
resolved under a threshold policy of a time periods is given by: 
25 Common model refers to the combined dataset of 12503 bugs  
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x
a
x
pxaXaP 
=
=
1
})(Pr{)( (6) 
Where, xp is the conditional probability given by equation 2. Assuming that the arrival 
process is Poisson with rate  per month, and n engineer slots available each month for 
assignment of incoming bugs, and a utilization rate of )(a , n )(a bugs will be worked on 
at any point in time. The exit rate of bugs from the system is given by  n
)(
)(
ae
a . In steady 
state, the condition for stability of the queue is: 
1)()( <=
n
aea  (7) 
Using equation 7, we formulate an optimization problem to maximize the overall number of 
successful resolutions given an available capacity of n engineer slots as shown below: 
)(aPMax
a
 (8) 
Subject to   nae <)( a =1,2,3,4…  (9) 
Figure 9 # The queuing process 
 
To maximize equation 8, we need to find the a, that meets the constraints in equation 9. Also, 
the maximum number of time periods a bug is allowed to stay in the system under a 
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threshold policy of a months before declaring the bug as unsuccessfully resolved can be 
written as: 




>
=
= 

=
ax
ad
xaU
x
t
x
0
......3,2,1),1(
})(Pr{
1
1 (10) 
where, xd is the conditional probability of moving the bugs to unsuccessfully resolved at the 
end of month x given that no decision has been reached on the state of the bug until month x-
1. Using equation 4 and equation 10, we can rewrite equation 6 as  
  

=

=












++
=
1
1
1 1
})(Pr{)1()(
a
a
x
x a
xaSdaP


(11) 
where 

=
=
1
1
)1(})(Pr{
x
j
jpxaS and 1++
=
j
p j 
 .
Given that the resolution can be cut off at t = a, expected time a bug stays in the system as a 
function of the threshold time period a is:  

=
=
a
x
xaXae
1
})(Pr{)( (12) 
In equation 12, 1)1( =e , and )(e is the expected number of time periods a bug stays in the 
system when cut off policy is not imposed. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the changes in 
)(ae and )(aP with increasing a. One can see in Figure 11, by the end of Month 7, P(a) is 
97.3 % of its peak value of 0.77.  
 Our dataset of 12503 bugs spanned a total of 97 months and came from 31 different 
teams. Treating them as a single group, and assuming steady state arrival of bugs implies an 
arrival rate of, = 12503/97 = 128.9/Month across all the projects. The maximum likelihood 
107
estimate for xd was computed from Table 15 based on the proportion of bugs that were 
moved to unsuccessfully resolved state in period x conditional on no decision until period x-
1. The maximum likelihood values of  and  are shown in Table 17. The expected 
number of months taken to resolve under no threshold policy, )(e is 047.2 . The expected 
number of months the bugs are in the system based on data shown in Table 15 is 
25362/12503 = 2.028. Further, )(P – the proportion of bugs successfully resolved – as 
obtained from the model is 0.77. From Table 15, we can see that this turns out to be 
9672/12503= 0.77. The above numbers suggest that the aggregate model describes the 
phenomenon well. Finally, the total number of engineer slots required is given by 
26488.263204.2*9.128)( ==e engineer slots per month. In the next section, we 
understand the implications of imposing threshold cut-off time period in a multiple group 
setting. 
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Figure 11 # Cumulative probability of successful resolution with time 
 
4.5. Multiple group model 
In this section, we relax the assumption that all the bugs come from a single group. 
We segregate our data based on the bug source. We identified six different groups that filed 
the bugs (see Table 18 for detailed breakup of the groups, the parameter estimates – i and 
i , standard errors, Chi-square and log likelihood for each subgroup). These sources of 
reported bugs differed based on the stage of the development cycle in which the bugs are 
filed and consequently the knowledge of the bug filer about the specifications and the code 
base of the software. These sources were divided into those found during 
development/maintenance, development-related activities (compilation, compliance testing, 
code inspection), actual customer deployment, deployment-related testing (alpha testing and 
beta testing), regression testing (involves performing integration testing on the product before 
it is released to customers) and unit testing or Devtest (involves testing individual software 
components prior to integration). Table 18 also displays the percentage of successfully 
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resolved bugs in each of the above categories. Any rule for allocating resources must specify 
how available capacity is allocated across the sub-groups of bugs. 
For the multi-group case equations 8 and equation 9 can be modified to: 

=
k
i
iiia
aPMax
i 1
)( (13)
Subject to nae
k
i
iii <
=1
)( 4,3,2,1= k …m (14) 
From equations 13 and 14, for any given slot size, we can determine the maximum resolution 
rate by enumerating all the feasible cut-offs over the 6 groups in question. However, 
enumerating all possible combinations of the cut-off time periods lead to 326 (1,073,741,824) 
combinations (6 groups and a possible maximum of 32 time periods for each group).  To 
reduce the number of enumerations, we can aggregate individual groups to form a meta-
group. We now present the grouping rationale. 
 
Creating Meta-groups 
From a software engineering perspective, the six sources of bugs described earlier can 
be divided into three meta-groups. The first meta-group comprises bugs discovered during 
development and development-related activities (including compilation, compliance 
examination, and code inspection tasks). These activities are usually performed by 
development/maintenance engineers who work closely with the software code. On account 
their good understanding of the code, these engineers can provide relatively precise 
information and guidance to the maintenance engineers work on bug resolution. Therefore, 
the bugs filed within this meta-group can be expected to have a high fraction of successfully 
resolved bugs as compared to those filed by other entities. The second meta-group comprises 
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bugs discovered during regression and unit testing. These types of testing are performed 
when various software components have been integrated, or when a completed module needs 
to be tested for its functionality. Bugs discovered during such testing can span multiple 
components, or multiple code bases within a component. Therefore, these bugs can be more 
difficult to reproduce and resolve. Finally, the third meta-group comprises bugs filed by 
customers and bugs which are deployment-related (the latter could include bugs discovered 
during the alpha and beta testing stages). Customers are least familiar with the software code. 
Further, during the alpha and beta testing stages and during the live deployment of the 
software at customer locations, the software may be put to work in diverse environments not 
encountered during the formal testing process. This may lead to the discovery of bugs which 
are either not well specified or not easily reproducible in the lab environment. Thus, these 
bugs are least likely to be successfully resolved.  
We now check this three-way grouping empirically. Consider the percentage of 
successfully resolved bugs across the meta-groups in Table 19. As expected, development 
and development-related bugs have the highest percentage of successfully resolved bugs (See 
actual fraction of bugs resolved in each subgroup), Customer found and deployment-related 
bugs have the least fraction of bugs resolved and finally the testing bugs fall between the 
other two. Further, we can empirically demonstrate the equivalence of the pairs of sources 
which are combined within each meta-group by comparing parameter estimates ( and  )
across the source-pairs. To verify this grouping rigorously, we investigated the equivalence 
of the parameters  and  by considering a pair of values in any given time and tested 
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whether they were significantly different from each other26. If both  and  are not 
significantly different from each other for individual groups, then the groups are equivalent. 
In that case, we created a new subgroup by treating the two groups to be the same and re-
estimated  and  for the combined group. If either  or  for two groups are 
significantly different from each other, we treat them as distinct groups.   
Our tests of parameter equivalence yielded three distinct meta-groups. Interestingly, 
these groups are consistent with earlier theoretical observations of grouping by stage of the 
development life cycle. The estimates of  and  , the log-likelihood, and the Pearson’s chi-
square for each of the meta-group is presented in Table 19. In addition to the calculated 
estimates of  and  , Table 19 also presents the data for the predicted and actual times the 
bug stays in the system, and the predicted and actual probability of a bug being successfully 
resolved, for each meta-group. The closeness of the predicted and actual estimates in Table 
19 suggests validation of the beta-geometric approach in individual meta-groups.  
 
26 This was done by a simple transformation of the beta geometric distribution to 1)b(ta
p
1
t
+= based on 
Weinberg and Gladen (1986). We can introduce a covariate Z and write the function as 
))1(()1(1 11 +++= tdcZtbapt
. This enables us to test for the significance of coefficients (obtained using 
maximum likelihood) c and d to estimate the equivalence between the groups.  
112
Table 18 # Maximum Likelihood estimates of  and 
Main Group Sub Group SampleSize
  Chi-
Square(DF)
Log-
Likelihood
%
Successfully
Resolved
Common Group 1.025 0.543
Common Group
Standard Error
12503
0.024 0.023
223.96 (31) -14777.4 77.30%
Development 1.031 0.543
Standard Error
2245
0.066 0.046
73.58 (31) -2751.54 91.63%
Regression and
Automation 0.836 0.616
Standard Error
1818
0.084 0.073
40.23 (22) -1860.52 72.28%
Customer Found 0.871 1.198
Standard Error
2119
0.067 0.12
75.69 (31) -2964.77 69.80%
Devtest 0.795 0.575
Standard Error
5023
0.043 0.038
115.71 (31) -5445.33 74.74%
Development-related 1.207 0.663
Standard Error
729
0.154 0.107
40.80 (20) -864.035 87.40%
Deployment-related 0.97 1.087
Grouping by the
Filer of the Bug
Standard Error
512
0.369 0.145
27.99 (31) -698.409 74.41%
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Group Item Estimate LogLikelihood Chi-Square
Arrival Rate 27.12/Month
 (S.E) 1.062 (0.060)
 (S.E) 0.565 (0.042)
Predicted expected time to successful resolution 2.08 Months
Actual expected time to successful resolution 2.07 Months
Predicted probability of successful resolution 0.9
Development
and
Development-
related
Actual fraction successfully resolved 0.905
-3636.52 101.68 (31)
Arrival Rate 70.52/Month
 (S.E) 0.804 (0.038)
 (S.E) 0.585 (0.033)
Predicted expected time to successful resolution 1.805 Months
Actual expected time to successful resolution 1.783 Months
Predicted probability of successful resolution 0.738
Regression
and
Devtest
Actual fraction successfully resolved 0.74
-7305.96 143.88 (31)
Arrival Rate 31.24/Month
 (S.E) 0.887 (0.061)
 (S.E) 1.172 (0.105)
Predicted expected time to successful resolution 2.62 Months
Actual expected time to successful resolution 2.61 Months
Predicted probability of successful resolution 0.703
Customer Found
and
Deployment-
related
Actual fraction successfully resolved 0.706
-3665.81 81.30 (31)
Table 19 # Maximum Likelihood estimates and related data for sub-groups
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Enumeration of cut-offs 
The creation of meta-groups simplifies the number of enumerations required 
considerably. As against the 326 (1,073,741,824) enumerations required earlier, we now have 
to consider only 323 (32,768) enumerations to choose the optimal cut-off combination. We 
now present the algorithm for choosing the optimal cut off. This algorithm is based on 
Kaplan et al. (1992).  
 
Initialize: Set LOWERBOUND  RR = 0, )(* nai =0, )(
* na j =0,  )(* nak =0 3,2,1,, = kji
Set UPPERBOUND ,)(max nai ),(
max na j 3,2,1,,)(max = kjinak
OUTER LOOP: FOR i = 1,2,3 )(nai = 1, 2, 3, 4, … )(
max nai
MIDDLE LOOP:  FOR 3,2,1=j and ij  , =)(na j 1,2,3,4….. )(
max na j
INNER LOOP:  FOR 3,2,1=k , ik  , jk  
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 
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k
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if  RRaPaPaP kkkjjjiii >++ )()()(  then 
set )()(* nana ii = , )()(
* nana jj = , )()(* nana kk =
Set RRaPaPaP kkkjjjiii =++ )()()( 
The optimal combination of )(nai for a given n (slot size) is one that maximizes the 
overall resolution rates for a given slot size. Figure 12 shows the optimal cut-off schedule for 
individual groups with increasing slot size. In particular, when the number of slots is lower, it 
reflects the tradeoffs that need to be made in imposing the cut off months on a type of bug.  
From Figure 12, we see that when the available number of slots is low, the resolution rate can 
be maximized by focusing on developer filed bugs. Intuitively, this is consistent with the 
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observation in our data that the probability of successful resolution of developer filed bugs is 
high (0.90). Note that in this allocation, all the incoming bugs from any source in a time 
period are treated equally, i.e., if even one bug from that source is admitted then all the bugs 
from that source should be admitted. For example, in period 1 if the management has 15 slots 
and the minimum number of slots needed to accommodate all the incoming arrivals of the 
developer filed bugs in period 1 is 28 slots, none of the bugs will be accommodated. We 
label this approach as the “equality rule.” However, this approach need not necessarily yield 
us the maximum resolution at any point in time.  
To maximize resolution rates for any given capacity without imposing the equality 
rule, one can follow a scheme where bugs are allocated based on the highest marginal 
resolution probability in each time period. We call this allocation scheme the “marginal 
probability rule.” In this case, given the availability of 30 slots, after completing the 
allocation of the slots to the bugs with highest probability of resolution – For example, 
developer filed bugs in the first time period because of highest resolution probability in the 
period –, any left over slots are given to the bugs with the next highest marginal resolution 
probability – In this case, tester filed bugs in the first time period. However, note that, not all 
arrivals of the second group can necessarily be served and to the extent that the slots for 
assignment are available a fraction of the bugs is served. For time periods that are greater 
than one month, we can determine the number of bugs in steady state that are carried forward 
to the next period (for example period 2) and assign only a fraction of the bugs for which the 
slots are available in that period. Table 20 shows a comparison of the resolution rates 
between the “marginal probability rule” and the “equality rule”. The following example 
illustrates the interpretation of the results shown in Table 20. For 150 slots, the optimal 
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policy would impose a cut off period of 2 months on development and development-related 
bugs, 2 months on regression and unit test bugs and one month on customer and deployment-
related bugs. Further, the policy indicates that engineers should work on all development and 
development-related bugs until the end of second period, work on all regression and unit test 
bugs until the end of first period and carry forward only 76% of the leftover bugs from this 
meta-group to be worked on in the second period, and finally, work on all customer and 
deployment-related bugs till the end of the first period (no bugs in this last meta-group are 
carried forward into the second period). Finally, note that as expected, the “marginal 
probability rule” allocation performs better in terms of the resolution rates particularly when 
the slot sizes are low. However, for all slot size numbers greater than 150, both the rules 
perform equally well. From a managerial perspective, however, implementing the “marginal 
probability rule” requires keeping track of the number of bugs that one needs to work on in a 
particular category for any slot size. 
Table 20 also shows the cumulative resolution rates based on the “equality rule.” 
Figure 13 shows the cut off combinations for the maximum resolution rate for the “Marginal 
Resolution rule” case. Figure 14 shows the relative percentage of bugs resolved – computed 
as 





++
++
100*
)()()(
)()()(
332211
333222111
PPP
aPaPaP

 – with increase in number of slots available. This 
shows that the marginal rate of resolution of bugs reduces as the slot sizes increase indicating 
that the sensitivity of addition of capacity on overall rates of successful resolution is low as 
more people are added into the teams. 
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Table 20 # Integer Cutoffs and Fraction considered for resolution based on Marginal Probability Rule
 Maximum Integer Cut offs 
Fraction of Bugs considered for 
resolution in the “Maximum Integer 
Cut off period” 
Slots Devel-opment Testing Customer 
Devel-
opment Testing Customer 
Resolution 
Rate -- 
Marginal 
Probability 
rule 
Resolution 
Rate -- 
Equality 
rule 
30 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 19.37 17.71 
35 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 22.27 20.88 
40 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.00 25.16 22.17 
45 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 28.06 23.25 
50 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.00 30.95 23.96 
55 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 33.85 24.37 
60 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.00 36.74 31.17 
65 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.00 39.64 31.17 
70 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.00 42.53 34.35 
75 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.00 45.43 40.83 
80 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 48.32 40.83 
85 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.00 51.22 40.83 
90 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.00 54.11 46.62 
95 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.96 0.00 57.01 46.62 
100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.08 59.55 58.54 
105 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.23 61.71 58.54 
110 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.39 63.86 63.00 
115 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.55 66.02 64.33 
120 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 68.17 64.69 
125 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 70.32 67.50 
130 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 1.00 1.00 72.45 72.00 
135 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.35 1.00 1.00 72.45 72.00 
140 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.18 1.00 76.29 75.18 
145 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 1.00 77.97 77.13 
150 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 1.00 79.66 78.93 
155 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.21 1.00 1.00 81.30 80.97 
160 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 82.76 82.25 
165 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 84.21 83.33 
170 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 85.66 84.71 
175 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.39 1.00 86.93 86.67 
180 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 88.11 87.64 
185 4.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 89.25 88.79 
190 4.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 90.34 89.85 
195 5.00 4.00 3.00 1.00 0.34 1.00 91.30 91.12 
200 5.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 0.16 92.21 92.00 
205 5.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 93.07 92.80 
210 6.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 93.82 93.69 
215 7.00 5.01 5.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 94.54 94.43 
220 7.00 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.57 95.17 95.05 
225 9.00 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 95.76 95.65 
230 10.00 7.00 8.00 1.00 1.00 0.28 96.29 96.19 
235 11.00 8.00 9.00 1.00 1.00 0.34 96.76 96.65 
240 12.00 9.00 10.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 97.19 97.08 
245 14.00 11.00 11.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 97.56 97.47 
250 16.00 12.00 13.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 97.89 97.79 
255 19.00 15.00 16.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 98.17 98.07 
260 24.00 18.00 20.00 1.00 1.00 0.27 98.41 98.31 
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Figure 12 # Optimal cut off combinations for different groups given slot size – Equality Rule 
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Figure 13 # Optimal cut off combinations for different groups given slot size – Marginal Probability Rule 
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Figure 14 # Relative resolution rates for the three groups based on slot size 
 
4.6. Waiting Time tradeoffs 
In this section, we analyze the effects of imposing the cut off policies on the waiting 
times of bugs in the system. Longer queues not only lead to assignment delays, but also lead 
to resolution delays. Using approximations developed in prior literature, we analyze two 
different cases. First, we analyze the case where bugs are handled on a First Come First 
Serve (FCFS) basis. Next, we analyze the case assuming the incoming population follows a 
preemptive resume priority queue with higher severity bugs preempting the lower severity 
bugs.  
 
Non-preemptive FCFS case 
Let )(aWNP  be the total time a bug spends in the system when a threshold policy of a
time periods is enforced in the non-preemptive case. Therefore: 
)()()( aWaeaW QNP += (15) 
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)(aWQ is the waiting time in the queue with a threshold policy of a time periods and 
T(a) is the expected time that the bug spends in service – as calculated earlier. We assume 
that the arrival process of the bugs is poisson – with rate  – consistent with related literature 
in software reliability (van Pul 1994). We assume the queue to be an M/G/n queue.  
The waiting times in queue for the non-preemptive FCFS case can be computed for 
the M/G/n queue using the approximation suggested by Whitt (1983). )(aWQ can be 
approximated by27 
)),(,(
)(
))((1
2
1)( 2 naPQae
aXVaraWQ 





+= (16) 
Here, )),(,( naPQ  is the exact delay for a M/M/n system with arrival rate  . Table 21 
shows the mean time a bug spends in the system and Table 22 gives the sensitivity analysis 
as the number of slots is increased from 264 to 275. One can see that the queue length 
reduces to zero as the slot size increases from 264 to 275. Note that the computation has an 
underlying assumption that each incoming bug can be assigned to any individual. However, 
in reality, teams are divided into individual “projects” – supervised by a lead – that may have 
reduced number of servers (engineers). This has a direct impact in increasing the waiting line 
of the bugs. To analyze the impact of this phenomenon, we show the similar analysis by 
using only one of the teams. The results of the waiting line and the impact of increase in 
number of slots in the system is shown in Table 23. This is considerably larger as compared 
to the waiting times shown in Table 21 implying that at a team level, such policies may have 
greater impact.  
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Preemptive resume priority case 
In this section, we investigate the case where higher severity bugs can be pre-empted 
by bugs of lower severity – consistent with the observation that higher severity bugs have to 
be resolved with a greater urgency. More specifically, we grouped the bugs into three 
categories (Group 1: Severity 1 and Severity 2, Group 2: Severity 3 and Severity 4, and 
Group 3: Severity 5 and Severity 6). To calculate the waiting times in queue under pre-
emptive resume priority, we use the method suggested by Bondi and Buzen (1984) as shown 
in equation 17. 28 
)1,,,(
),,,(
)1,,,(),,,(
)()(
)()(
)()()()(
pp
pp
pppp nFCFSW
nFCFSW
nPRIWnPRIW
µ
µ
µµ  (17) 
Here, ),,,( )()( nPRIW pp µ is the computed waiting time for the system with n servers under 
a pre-emptive resume priority (PRI) discipline for the p priority classes29, with an arrival rate 
vector ),...,( 21)( pp  = and a service rate vector denoted by ),...,( 21)( pp µµµµ = .
),,,( )()( nFCFSW pp µ is the waiting time for the M/G/n system with a first come first serve 
(FCFS) priority. This can be computed using the approximations in Nozaki and Ross (1978), 
or Boxma et al. (1978).  
 
27 We can also compute this using other approximations by Boxma et al. (1979) and by Nozaki and Ross 
(1978). We verified our waiting times with all the three approximations. They yield values that are very close to 
each other. The expressions for the approximations are given in the appendix. 
28 Notations used in the equations are consistent with Bondi and Buzen (1984) 
29 Note that our assumption of pre-emptive resume priority queue is reasonable in this scenario given that 
engineers have some prior knowledge of the resolution history of the preempted bug 
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)1,,,( )()( ppnFCFSW µ is the waiting time for the M/G/1 system with a first come first serve 
priority with an average service rate of )( pnµ , where )( pnµ is the mean service rate weighted 
by the p priority levels is given by  )( pµ 









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
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µ . This can be obtained using 
Pollaczek-Khintchine Formula.
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Here 
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)(  for the p priority classes and 
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p
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1
)(  . The condition of stability of 
the queue implies that  <= 1/)( ii nr µ .
)1,,,( )()( ppnPRIW µ indicates the average waiting time for an M/G/1 pre-emptive priority 
queue with p priority classes and is computed as  
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Here, iW is the expected waiting time for individual priority class i and  
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Finally, the approximation given in equation 17 as suggested by Bondi and Buzen 
(1984) is better when the queue of the high priority customers is not very long. In our data 
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the grouping of Severity 1 and Severity 2 bugs constituted 3253/12503 = 26% of the overall 
number of bugs.  
Bondi and Buzen (1988) find that the approximation suggested by Boxma et al. 
(1978) gives more accurate predictions as opposed to the approximations suggested by 
Nozaki and Ross (1978) when they compared the approximations to the simulated values. 
Accordingly we computed the waiting times based on Boxma et al. (1978). Finally, the total 
time in the system W(a) is given by:  
)()()(
/1),,,()( pppPP nPRIWaW µµ += (21) 
Here, )(aWPP is the overall waiting time for the PRI case. Table 21 provides estimates of 
)(aWPP  computed based on waiting time approximation suggested by Boxma et al. (1978). 
We find that preemption increases the overall delay significantly. In particular this is true for 
the lower priority classes. This illustrates that in reality, the waiting times may be 
significantly large due to the nature of the process, thus reinforcing the need for cutting off 
working on the bugs at any particular point in time. In particular, we also find that, while the 
resolution times of high severity bugs are not compromised in the overall system, preemption 
has a serious impact on the system waiting times of the low severity bugs with increasing 
time periods the bugs stay in the system. For clarity, Table 24 and Table 25 enumerate the 
steps used to compute WNP and WPP shown in Table 21.   
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Cut off time 
period (a) 
Resolution  
Probability 
WNP 
(264 slots) 
WNP 
(265 slots) 
WPP 
(264 slots) 30 
WPP 
(265 slots) 
1 0.566 1.00 1.00 1.000 1.000 
2 0.665 1.29 1.29 1.290 1.291 
3 0.704 1.45 1.45 1.449 1.449 
4 0.724 1.55 1.55 1.553 1.554 
5 0.736 1.63 1.63 1.630 1.632 
6 0.744 1.69 1.69 1.698 1.698 
7 0.750 1.74 1.74 1.781 1.772 
8 0.754 1.78 1.78 1.919 1.881 
9 0.757 1.82 1.82 2.178 2.072 
10 0.760 1.85 1.85 2.654 2.407 
11 0.762 1.88 1.88 3.478 2.968 
12 0.763 1.91 1.91 4.728 3.793 
13 0.764 1.94 1.94 6.592 4.985 
14 0.765 1.97 1.97 9.378 6.705 
15 0.766 2.01 2.00 13.387 9.079 
16 0.767 2.05 2.03 18.847 12.169 
17 0.768 2.09 2.07 26.349 16.193 
18 0.768 2.15 2.12 36.448 21.302 
19 0.769 2.22 2.18 50.031 27.702 
20 0.769 2.30 2.24 67.009 35.073 
21 0.769 2.41 2.31 89.900 44.073 
22 0.769 2.54 2.41 121.944 55.180 
23 0.770 2.72 2.52 165.156 67.926 
24 0.770 2.97 2.66 225.016 82.206 
25 0.770 3.26 2.81 299.609 95.844 
26 0.770 3.63 2.97 394.845 108.514 
27 0.770 4.08 3.14 509.075 118.875 
28 0.770 4.76 3.36 686.400 128.165 
29 0.770 5.95 3.64 996.681 133.695 
30 0.770 8.52 4.02 1672.947 128.995 
31 0.770 15.12 4.47 3402.699 119.444 
32 0.770 37.66 4.87   
Table 21 # Tradeoff between mean time a bug spends in the system and the probability of a successful 
resolution 
 
30 A breakup of waiting times by severity class is shown in Table 23 
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Non Preemptive setting Preemptive setting 
Slots 
Cut off 
Month 264 265 270 275 264 265 270 275 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 
3 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 
4 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 
5 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 
6 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.70 1.70 1.69 1.69 
7 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.78 1.77 1.75 1.74 
8 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.91 1.88 1.80 1.79 
9 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 2.14 2.08 1.85 1.83 
10 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.55 2.43 1.91 1.88 
11 1.88 1.88 1.87 1.87 3.24 3.02 1.99 1.93 
12 1.91 1.91 1.90 1.89 4.28 3.90 2.07 1.98 
13 1.94 1.94 1.92 1.91 5.81 5.17 2.17 2.04 
14 1.97 1.97 1.93 1.93 8.06 7.04 2.27 2.12 
15 2.01 2.00 1.95 1.95 11.26 9.66 2.39 2.19 
16 2.05 2.03 1.96 1.96 15.55 13.12 2.51 2.28 
17 2.09 2.07 1.98 1.98 21.38 17.73 2.62 2.36 
18 2.15 2.12 1.99 1.99 29.16 23.73 2.74 2.44 
19 2.22 2.18 2.00 2.00 39.53 31.50 2.85 2.53 
20 2.30 2.24 2.01 2.01 52.41 40.79 2.95 2.60 
21 2.41 2.31 2.02 2.01 69.64 52.69 3.05 2.68 
22 2.54 2.41 2.02 2.02 93.60 68.33 3.14 2.75 
23 2.72 2.52 2.03 2.03 125.70 87.80 3.23 2.82 
24 2.97 2.66 2.04 2.03 169.92 112.22 3.31 2.88 
25 3.26 2.81 2.04 2.04 224.69 139.22 3.38 2.93 
26 3.63 2.97 2.04 2.04 294.42 169.34 3.43 2.97 
27 4.08 3.14 2.05 2.04 377.95 200.38 3.48 3.01 
28 4.76 3.36 2.05 2.05 507.44 240.19 3.52 3.04 
29 5.95 3.64 2.05 2.05 733.76 292.85 3.57 3.08 
30 8.52 4.02 2.05 2.05 1226.61 365.47 3.61 3.11 
31 15.12 4.47 2.06 2.05 2485.66 449.36 3.64 3.13 
Table 22 #  Sensitivity of waiting line to slot size increments 
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Cut off time 
period (a) 
Probability of 
resolution  
Mean Time  
(52 slots) WNP 
Mean Time  
(53 slots) WNP 
1 0.531 1.00 1.00 
2 0.623 1.27 1.27 
3 0.657 1.41 1.41 
4 0.673 1.51 1.50 
5 0.682 1.59 1.58 
6 0.688 1.67 1.64 
7 0.693 1.76 1.71 
8 0.696 1.86 1.79 
9 0.698 1.99 1.87 
10 0.699 2.16 1.96 
11 0.701 2.37 2.07 
12 0.702 2.66 2.19 
13 0.702 3.02 2.32 
14 0.703 3.57 2.48 
15 0.704 4.56 2.68 
16 0.704 6.73 2.95 
17 0.704 12.74 3.25 
Table 23 # Tradeoff between mean time a bug spends in the system and the probability of a successful 
resolution – A single Project Case 
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Table 24 # Computation of waiting times of individual classes when preemptive resume priority is followed (264 Slots)
Cut off
period (a) 12W 3 4W 5 6W
)1,,,( )()( ppnPRIW µ ),,,( )()( nFCFSW pp µ )1,,,( )()( ppnF C F SW µ ),,,( )()( nPRIW pp µ
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
2 0.124 1.134 2.874 1.018 0.000 0.005 0.000
3 0.166 1.921 6.132 1.819 0.000 0.008 0.000
4 0.203 2.783 10.745 2.783 0.000 0.013 0.000
5 0.238 3.725 17.017 3.939 0.000 0.018 0.001
6 0.271 4.754 25.435 5.332 0.000 0.025 0.007
7 0.304 5.866 36.461 7.000 0.000 0.033 0.037
8 0.336 7.015 50.277 8.926 0.001 0.043 0.123
9 0.367 8.205 67.575 11.174 0.002 0.054 0.318
10 0.397 9.459 89.515 13.855 0.003 0.067 0.699
11 0.427 10.768 117.218 17.059 0.007 0.083 1.370
12 0.456 12.061 150.058 20.685 0.012 0.101 2.387
13 0.485 13.395 190.516 24.981 0.019 0.123 3.896
14 0.513 14.775 241.780 30.219 0.030 0.149 6.130
15 0.540 16.159 305.764 36.533 0.046 0.181 9.307
16 0.566 17.515 383.596 43.998 0.068 0.219 13.589
17 0.591 18.844 480.436 53.048 0.097 0.266 19.403
18 0.616 20.173 601.213 64.119 0.137 0.323 27.173
19 0.641 21.473 753.451 77.826 0.189 0.393 37.535
20 0.662 22.663 933.795 93.833 0.255 0.475 50.401
21 0.680 23.809 1165.350 114.132 0.343 0.579 67.625
22 0.698 24.934 1476.345 141.121 0.466 0.718 91.581
23 0.716 25.953 1877.999 175.693 0.632 0.897 123.679
24 0.730 26.889 2422.525 222.269 0.860 1.139 167.895
25 0.739 27.620 3082.253 278.432 1.144 1.431 222.653
26 0.748 28.240 3902.323 348.055 1.507 1.794 292.383
27 0.758 28.745 4858.342 429.078 1.941 2.216 375.914
28 0.767 29.253 6304.280 551.451 2.616 2.854 505.402
29 0.777 29.762 8742.947 757.613 3.794 3.929 731.721
30 0.786 30.274 13722.794 1178.255 6.363 6.122 1224.560
31 0.792 30.555 20931.922 1786.899 12.955 9.321 2483.611
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Table 25 # Computation of waiting times of individual classes when preemptive resume priority is followed (265 Slots)
Cut off
Period (a) 12W 3 4W 5 6W
)1,,,( )()( ppnPRIW µ ),,,( )()( nFCFSW pp µ )1,,,( )()( ppnF C F SW µ ),,,( )()( nPRIW pp µ
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
2 0.123 1.123 2.830 1.007 0.000 0.005 0.000
3 0.165 1.900 6.014 1.795 0.000 0.008 0.000
4 0.202 2.748 10.494 2.739 0.000 0.013 0.000
5 0.237 3.673 16.552 3.865 0.000 0.018 0.001
6 0.270 4.683 24.633 5.217 0.002 0.025 0.006
7 0.303 5.771 35.147 6.826 0.008 0.033 0.029
8 0.334 6.892 48.228 8.673 0.020 0.043 0.098
9 0.365 8.052 64.480 10.812 0.043 0.054 0.254
10 0.395 9.273 84.914 13.345 0.080 0.067 0.559
11 0.425 10.545 110.462 16.342 0.130 0.083 1.094
12 0.454 11.800 140.415 19.699 0.192 0.101 1.896
13 0.483 13.091 176.868 23.630 0.267 0.123 3.069
14 0.511 14.426 222.397 28.354 0.357 0.149 4.771
15 0.538 15.763 278.262 33.952 0.461 0.181 7.129
16 0.564 17.070 344.881 40.438 0.575 0.219 10.205
17 0.588 18.350 425.849 48.117 0.703 0.266 14.217
18 0.613 19.629 524.068 57.250 0.843 0.323 19.316
19 0.638 20.878 643.785 68.179 0.996 0.393 25.706
20 0.659 22.020 780.140 80.442 1.152 0.475 33.068
21 0.677 23.119 947.159 95.263 1.321 0.579 42.061
22 0.694 24.196 1158.476 113.809 1.510 0.718 53.162
23 0.712 25.171 1411.559 135.812 1.711 0.897 65.902
24 0.726 26.066 1723.454 162.727 1.913 1.139 80.177
25 0.735 26.765 2060.105 191.601 2.089 1.431 93.810
26 0.745 27.358 2426.795 222.940 2.243 1.794 106.477
27 0.754 27.840 2795.757 254.400 2.360 2.216 116.835
28 0.763 28.325 3260.879 293.976 2.450 2.854 126.123
29 0.773 28.812 3864.764 345.266 2.472 3.929 131.650
30 0.782 29.300 4679.512 414.354 2.330 6.122 126.949
31 0.789 29.569 5362.202 472.152 2.112 9.321 117.396
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4.7. Implications and conclusion 
Given that software maintenance is one of the most important and costly phases of the 
software product life cycle, managers need to explore newer ways of improving productivity 
in maintenance operations. Even though it is commonly believed that debugging is an 
important and resource intensive activity in software development life cycle, it has been 
labeled an understudied problem not only in computer science – as cited in Liberman (1997) 
– but also from a management science perspective. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first work to apply management science principles to manage debugging tasks in a software 
maintenance environment. From a managerial perspective, the implications of this work are 
the following: 
First, we suggest that managers may cut off working on a bug and still not greatly 
reduce their chance of successful resolution. Our computational study suggests time frames 
that one may pick for imposing the cut off threshold. We show that the probability of 
successfully resolving the tasks reduce with time, and imposition of threshold cut off can 
result in reducing the overall bug queues and minimize resolution delays without having a 
significant impact on the overall probability of successfully resolving bugs. From a service 
provider’s perspective, this can not only improve the utilization of current engineering 
resources, but also improve customer satisfaction by reducing waiting times.  
Second, the methodology can provide a good estimate of engineering capacity 
required in debugging environments. The fact that the estimates provided by the model 
closely matched the raw data in the example firm, lend credence to the approach adopted.  
Third, when individuals are working on bugs that come from multiple populations, 
we demonstrate that there may be benefits that can be gained if the nature of population is 
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taken into account particularly when the environment is capacity constrained. For example, 
the section on multiple group analysis investigates capacity constrained situations wherein 
the rates of successful resolution can be maximized. 
Bennett (1996) quotes: “The inability to undertake maintenance quickly, safely and 
cheaply means that for many organizations, a substantial applications backlog builds up.” 
(pp. 674) This phenomenon is clearly seen in our analysis. However, our analysis shows that 
one of the reasons for the phenomenon can be the nature of the process. We show that 
alternative policies of cutting off work beyond certain time may be a viable alternative to 
working on tasks that take unreasonably long.  
Finally, in this work, our objective is to study the performance of the service system, 
we abstract away from the question “what introduces heterogeneity in the population of 
bugs?31”However, the abstraction does not obscure the validity of the model (beta-geometric 
hazard). The model predicts both the combined data and sub classifications of the population 
very well. 
The idea of suggesting a threshold cut-off is not to suggest that bugs should be 
hidden, but we endeavor to understand the queueing tradeoffs in a debugging environment. 
Implementing such a policy in practice may be challenging. One of the ways such a policy 
can be implemented is that bugs could be flagged after x time periods for review by senior 
technical experts on the current situation to take an expedited decision on the current state of 
the bug.  
From the standpoint of generalization there are two aspects that need to be 
considered. First, can we use this approach to study other bug fixing situations? We believe 
 
31 Examples of work that investigate sources of heterogeneity are Kitchenham et al. (1999) and Kemerer and 
Slaughter (1997)  
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that this is possible given that the process of bug fixing is very much the same in most 
situations. However, this needs to be verified through further studies. Second, what are the 
other scenarios where this model may be applicable? We believe that such models can be 
applied to diverse environments/processes that may have the characteristics of decreasing 
probability of success with time. For example, product development environments where 
research has revealed the presence of a split population in the emergence of dominant designs 
with the passage of time (Srinivasan et al. 2006). Similar models with respect to developing 
new product or a project could be conceived where there is an uncertainty to completion of 
such projects and require a resource commitment from a management perspective. In the 
financial services industry, several researchers have used survival models for investigating 
the factors that affect the survival time of the loans (Shumway 2001; Roszbach 2004; Carling 
et al. 2001). Models used in this chapter can be adapted to examine the capacity of backend 
processes that may be needed in these environments.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5. Conclusion and Future Research 
Offshore outsourcing is today common in many industries, and one that is likely to 
grow over time as the legal, political, and technological barriers to global commerce are 
further dismantled. Despite this growth, the practitioner industry has cited dissatisfaction 
with the services that are delivered from such settings. This dissertation sheds light on 
managing software service operations by considering two different, but intricately linked 
facets of software operations – internal and external.  
The second chapter of the dissertation titled “Managing Outsourced Offshore 
projects: Antecedents of Project Performance and Customer Satisfaction” investigated the 
external facet of software operations. In this chapter, we adopted a multidisciplinary 
perspective to investigate how project management, team stability, communication 
effectiveness and other variables drive project performance and customer satisfaction. Using 
a structural equations model, first, we show that team stability, project management, 
communication effectiveness, and project performance impact overall customer satisfaction. 
Next, we demonstrate that contextual variables such as the nature of work (maintenance & 
development versus testing projects), the class of software (application software versus 
system software), and project duration (high age versus low age projects) moderate the 
overall impact of the antecedents on project performance and customer satisfaction.  
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In the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation, we investigate the “internal facet” 
of a software services organization. Focusing on software maintenance projects, we 
investigate antecedents of engineer productivity and methods to manage the process better 
with the aim of improving individual productivity. In chapter 3 of this dissertation titled 
“Individual Learning and Productivity in a Software Maintenance Environment: An 
Empirical Analysis” we investigate the determinants of individual learning in settings where 
individuals work on a variety of tasks. Our results in this work show that, first, performing a 
greater variety of tasks improves individual productivity. However, somewhat paradoxically, 
this increase in productivity involves an initial loss of productivity as the individual invests 
effort in learning new tasks to develop higher competency. Second, we also find that 
cumulative variety of tasks improves productivity. However, variety benefits more when the 
nature of experience is intensive. Third, we find that striving to gain a balance between 
intensiveness and extensiveness of experience leads to the highest productivity. Fourth, our 
results show that more experienced individuals can handle new tasks faster as compared 
individuals with less experience reflecting the transferable nature of experience accumulated. 
Fifth, individuals that belonged to a larger team were more productive than individuals that 
belonged to a smaller team reflecting evidence of learning in an environment where the 
individuals need not be performing the same task but can learn through collocation and 
informal collaboration and finally, we find empirical evidence of the impact of turnover and 
present nuances on the moderating effect of team size on the impact of turnover on 
productivity. 
Finally, in chapter 4 of the dissertation, titled “Resource Allocation in Software 
Maintenance,” we use the inherent characteristics of the debugging process to show that 
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productivity of software engineers can be improved by cutting off working on bugs after a 
certain time period.  We show using actual data that as software defects (bugs) stay in the 
system longer, the probability of successfully resolving them significantly reduces. Further, 
we use this insight to estimate required engineering resources to manage debugging efforts. 
Finally, we explore the cut off policies based on threshold time without finding a successful 
resolution. Our analysis in this work shows that such policies minimally impact rates of 
successful resolution, and reduce waiting times for incoming bugs in the system.  Through a 
computational study, we explore how such policies may improve overall productivity and 
enable efficient utilization of engineering resources. Together these three essays can 
contribute to the better management of software service operations and enable managers to 
improve productivity, and consequently, customer satisfaction.   
 
Extensions to Dissertation 
This dissertation can be extended on several fronts to understand the overall issue of 
offshore outsourcing better.   
 
Figure 15 #  Framework for future research 
 
Contracts
People
InfrastructureProcesses
Dissertation 
essays 1 and 3
Dissertation 
essay 2
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Figure 15 gives a framework on which the current dissertation is built and will also 
provide a framework for future research. The underlying idea of the framework is the firms 
have to have effective integration of people, process and infrastructure and have this 
integration in harmony with the contractual agreements to achieve higher performance. The 
first and the third essays – chapter 2 and chapter 4 – of this dissertation investigate the 
process level perspectives of managing software operations. For example, in chapter 2 we 
investigate how processes of project management, communication and team stability need to 
be managed to enable better project performance and customer satisfaction. Similarly in 
chapter 4 we exploit the characteristics of the process (the probability of successful 
resolution reaches zero with increasing time) to investigate opportunities to make 
improvements in the efficiency of the process.  The second essay of the dissertation – chapter 
3 – investigates aspects of how people can be trained to increase their performance by 
designing task allocation mechanisms.  
Based on the above framework, several extensions are possible that would be worth 
exploring. At the process level, the first essay can be extended by looking at the following 
framework. The key antecedents of customer satisfaction can be divided into (a) Outcome 
based antecedents, refers to measurable outcomes such as timeliness and quality as 
considered in the current setting (b) Procedure related antecedents, refers to the means 
adopted for the delivery of the product (such as project management) and finally (c) 
Experience based antecedents, refer to issues that can contribute to the experiences of the 
client in the delivery process.  
Considering all the three antecedents can provide a holistic view of offshore project 
delivery. Table 26 outlines some of the key issues that can be addressed in any one of the 
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three classes of antecedents. For example, in the context of output, one could incorporate and 
measure the intellectual contributions of the software development teams to the customer’s 
knowledge base. In the context of procedure based antecedents, one could include clients 
satisfaction with the vendor’s staffing, training and resource management, intellectual 
property protection and quality related processes. These may have a direct impact on the 
operational efficiency at the vendors end. Similarly, some of the experience related 
antecedents may include the level of commitment and empathy shown by the vendor’s 
project teams with the client teams, the cultural compatibility between the client and the 
vendor staff, the level of ‘ownership’ of the work shown by the offshore team and their 
involvement in providing proactive suggestions on various aspects of the project. Further, the 
interplay between project performance and the nature of financial contracts signed between 
the customer and the service provider can be studied (e.g., Gopal et al. 2003). Finally, issues 
related to competition and market performance in the context of offshore outsourcing can be 
investigated in this context. 
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Outcome Based Antecedents Procedure based Antecedents Experience based Antecedents 
a) Quality of deliverable 
 
b) Timeliness of deliverables 
 
c) Adherence to service level 
agreement parameters 
 
d) Process and product innovations 
 
a) Was the project managed well? 
 
b) Are the processes appropriate? 
 
c) Does the vendor have clear 
guidelines for handling issues that 
the engagement may face? 
 
d) Does the vendor have adequate 
mechanisms to fill in vacant slots 
in projects 
 
e) What are the process 
improvement procedures in place? 
 
f) How are procedures on 
intellectual property protection 
enforced 
 
a) Do the vendors engineers 
communicate well? 
 
b) Is there culture compatibility 
between offshore and onsite teams? 
 
c) How does the vendor handle 
crisis situations? 
 
d) Do they proactively raise issues 
and bring problems to light? 
 
e) Ownership of products and 
services by the vendor 
Table 26 # Outcome, procedure and experience based antecedents in offshore projects 
 
In the context of learning (people related aspects of the framework in Figure 14), the 
following issues appear to particularly merit research attention. First, how should the learning 
pattern for an individual be crafted to maximize the productivity of the team and the firm? 
This pattern, which would ideally be sensitive to the existing experience of the individual and 
the knowledge sharing pathways within the team, would lay out how the individual’s 
exposure to task specialization and task variety would vary across time. This approach would 
also better integrate the training and knowledge sharing literatures. Further, the pattern of 
learning across projects can influence the adoption of higher-level problem solving strategies. 
For example, learning by trial and error and selectionism constitute two distinct problem 
solving strategies in the product development context (Sommer and Loch 2004). These 
approaches involve different levels of exposure to variety, and hence different learning 
outcomes.  
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Second, the roles of exposure to variety and specialization in driving learning can be 
connected more tightly with the concept of job design. One can conceptualize job design as 
detailing the choice and sequences of tasks carried out by an employee, the linkages between 
these tasks and those of co-workers, and the incentive and motivational system that 
encourages employees to input effort into the tasks. Next, the issue of how the concept of job 
design can be expanded to accommodate the correct balance between task specialization and 
exposure to variety towards enhancing employee learning and productivity becomes relevant 
in this context.  
Third, we can investigate the impact of “Recency Effect” – how recent is the 
exposure – on the overall rates of learning and the role of recent exposure to variety. For 
example Nembhard and Osothsilp (2001) compare different types of forgetting models in 
their work. Some of these models can be applicable in the context of knowledge workers. 
One such application was by Shafer et al. (2001) who investigated forgetting effects on 
assembly line workers by empirical means. In a similar environment McCreery et al. (2001) 
find that for complex tasks forgetting effects in assembly line environment may be high. 
Such effects may be worth investigating in our setting.  
Fourth, another potential area of research in the context of variety is to examine 
degree of interrelatedness of tasks on learning outcomes. Even though the tasks performed by 
the individuals in our study are related, the degree of interrelatedness and its effect on 
productivity needs to be better understood. This is because relatedness in task can be a 
continuum depending on the number of common skills between two different tasks since the 
time taken to learn a task is proportional to the total number of different skills required to 
learn the task (Jovanovic and Griliches 1995). Such an understanding may enable us to gain 
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insights on the relationship between task interrelatedness, productivity and task variety. 
However, given the nature of the current dataset that may not be a feasible option.  
Finally, the idea of HHEI can be applied to several other situations to explain the 
influence of variety on productivity in manufacturing operations literature. For example, 
Ramdas (2003) pointed out that researchers such as Fisher and Ittner (1999) and Macduffie et 
al. (1996) arrived at opposite conclusions on the impact of product variety on assembly line 
productivity. Indices such as HHEI could be tried in such contexts to investigate the overall 
exposure of relative variety levels in this scenario.  
Finally, from a process perspective, the work in chapter 4 can be expanded into other 
areas. First, the work on chapter 4 can also be extended to consider capacity planning and 
resource allocation in product development environments. This approach is also likely to be 
consistent with prior research that has revealed the presence of a split population – i.e. a few 
designs will never see the light of the day – in the emergence of dominant product designs 
(Srinivasan et al. 2006). Similar models with respect to developing new product or a project 
could be conceived where there is an uncertainty to completion of such projects and require a 
resource commitment from a management perspective.   
Second, we are currently considering is the idea of dynamic task allocation. These 
problems are also called online task allocation problems. In this setup, the manager faces the 
problem of scheduling tasks ‘real time’ to project members. The key characteristic of this 
problem is that tasks have to be assigned to engineers at a given time with uncertainty about 
future arrivals. This problem differs from standard scheduling problems in the sense that the 
after each allocation the experience of the engineer is updated and evolves and thus this also 
impacts the myopic allocation decisions. Understanding the effects of such myopic real time 
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task allocation on overall productivity of the team is an interesting problem that can be 
considered. 
Finally, on the role of contracts, one could investigate the role of contracts and 
incentives on the overall performance of the projects. For example Gopal et al. (2003) 
investigate the antecedents of fixed bid and time and material projects in organizations. They 
point to project characteristics that made organizations to sign fixed bid and time and 
material contracts in offshore projects. However, the nature of people that staff the projects 
are also governed by the nature of contracts. In this context, questions such as “Do projects 
perform better when contracts signed are fixed bid or time and material?,” “How do the 
contracts impact the choice of infrastructure, people and process related practices in an 
outsourced environment?,” still need to be answered. Many of these factors may have a direct 
impact on the performance of such projects. Further, the framework can also provide some 
insights and directions on evaluating the bids for projects for both the customer and the 
vendor by examining the linkages between the contracts and the other infrastructure 
parameters. These factors may be worth investigating as extensions to the dissertation.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Derivation of the Beta Geometric Distribution 
The generic probability of resolution when p is drawn from a distribution with pdf 
)( pf is given by equation 1
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The probability of not resolving until period t-1 is given by  
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Using equations 25 and 26 the conditional probability of resolving at time t given that the 
bug has not been successfully resolved until time t-1 is given by: 
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Simplifying equation 27 gives us the expression in equation 2.
Likelihood Function – Beta-Geometric Hazard 
In each period the bugs can be classified as successfully resolved or unsuccessfully 
resolved. The likelihood function for each period can be written as:  
 mnt
m
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The likelihood function can be written as:  
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An Alternative Approach to calculating the Beta-Geometric Hazard 
An alternative approach to calculating the hazard that we will frequently use for our 
purposes is attributed to Weinberg and Gladen (1986).  Equation 29 can be decomposed into 
a series of cycle specific hazard rates.  
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If we denote jp as the hazard rate then the equation 31 can be written as  
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Trinomial Model 
This model draws from the beta-geometric model. In this model bugs can be 
categorized into three distinct groups. The first group is one that is resolved in each period. 
The second group is the one that is classified as cannot be resolved. Finally, the third group is 
the carried forward into the next period on which no decision is made. We assume that in 
each trial, the probability of resolution is drawn from a beta-geometric distribution. The 
Likelihood function for this case is  
 
smnsm ppL = ))1)(1(())1((  (34) 
Where  is the population that cannot be resolved,  p is given by equation 2. The reasoning 
for the likelihood equation is as follows. In each period a bug is resolved with a probability 
p)1(  because the bug does not belong to the “irresolvable” category, is declared 
“irresolvable” with probability  and finally can be carried forward with a probability 
))1)(1(( p .
Thus the resulting likelihood function for which parameters need to be estimated will be: 
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Nozaki and Ross (1978) approximation 
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The value of W(D) (waiting time for a M/D/n priority queue) can be obtained from the 
approximations suggested by Cosmetatos (1975) where 
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